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Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold
W. B. Yeats, “The Second Coming”1
                                               
1 W. B. Yeats, “The Second Coming,” in The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats, Definitive Edition, with 
Author’s Final Revisions (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), 184.
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ABSTRACT
“THE UNION AS IT WAS AND THE CONSTITUTION AS IT IS”:
UNIONISM AND EMANCIPATION IN 
CIVIL WAR ERA KENTUCKY
JACOB F. LEE
MAY 12, 2007
In his 1926 study of the Civil War era in Kentucky, southern historian E. Merton 
Coulter repeated the old saying that Kentucky was the only state to secede after 
Appomattox.  In an over-simplification of the process, most historians have seen harsh 
Union military policy as the root of Kentucky’s ideological shift.  However, in reading 
letters, diaries, and speeches written by Kentuckians during the Civil War, it becomes 
obvious that while Kentuckians were aware of and concerned about military policy, they 
were more alarmed by emancipation as a Union war goal.  This thesis argues that 
emancipation and the subsequent enlistment of black troops contributed to Kentucky’s 
adoption of a southern identity.  Because of emancipation, many Kentuckians saw 
themselves as more akin to their fellow slaveholders in the South than to those 
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INTRODUCTION
In his 1926 study of the Civil War era in Kentucky, southern historian E. Merton 
Coulter repeated the old saying that Kentucky was the only state to secede after 
Appomattox.1  While the historical record demonstrates a move toward pro-southern 
sentiments in the state during the war, the reasons for this shift have been over-simplified.  
Most historians have seen harsh Union military policy as the root of Kentucky’s 
ideological shift.  While many Kentuckians, both loyal and not, suffered at the hands of 
Union soldiers, historians have ignored a more important factor in the state’s changing 
loyalty.  Caught between their loyalty to the Union and their cultural and economic ties to 
slavery, Civil War-era Kentuckians attempted to hold a middle ground in which they 
could defend both the Union and their domestic institutions. The Emancipation 
Proclamation altered the nature of the conflict, and the war for the Union also became a 
war for black freedom.  Even through the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolishing slavery in the United States, Kentuckians were unable to link the preservation 
of the Union with the demise of the peculiar institution.  In the end, emancipation and the 
enlistment of black soldiers contributed to Kentucky’s adoption of a southern identity.  
While Coulter is the most well known historian to have argued that the Union 
military’s treatment of Kentucky civilians resulted in the state’s shift in sentiment, that 
explanation did not begin with him.  In the late-nineteenth century, numerous Kentucky 
                                               
1 E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1926; reprint, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966), 439.
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historians offered that interpretation of events.2  Lewis and Richard H. Collins’s
Historical Sketches of Kentucky (1874) presented a chronology of the Civil War in 
Kentucky that emphasized military harshness.3  N. S. Shaler’s Kentucky: A Pioneer 
Commonwealth (1884) also focused on the relationship between Kentucky and its 
“oppressors.”4  While Shaler, a Unionist during the war, recognized the effects of 
emancipation and especially black enlistment, he overstated the importance of military 
presence on Kentucky’s loyalty.  Z. F. Smith’s A History of Kentucky: From Its Earliest 
Discovery and Settlement, to the Present Date (1886) echoed Shaler to the point that 
much of his discussion of emancipation consisted of block quotes from Kentucky: A 
Pioneer Commonwealth.5  These few studies are representative of the interpretations put 
forward in other nineteenth century histories of Kentucky.
Based heavily on Collins’s Historical Sketches, E. Merton Coulter’s The Civil 
War and Readjustment in Kentucky (1926) was the first scholarly work on Kentucky 
during the war.6  The grandson of Confederate veterans and a proponent of the William 
A. Dunning school of Civil War historiography, Coulter used his work as a diatribe 
against Federal officials stationed in Kentucky. Coulter argued that Kentuckians
tolerated the North because of economic ties, despite being socially and culturally 
                                               
2 One exception was Thomas Speed who emphasized Kentucky’s continued Unionism and defended 
military policy in the state; Thomas Speed, The Union Cause in Kentucky, 1861-1865 (New York: G. B. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1907).
3 Lewis and Richard H. Collins, Collins’ Historical Sketches of Kentucky, vol. 1 (Covington, KY: Collins & 
Co., 1874; reprint, Louisville: John P. Morton & Co., 1924), 85-159.
4 N. S. Shaler, Kentucky: A Pioneer Commonwealth (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1884), 350.
5 Z. F. Smith, The History of Kentucky: From Its Earliest Discovery and Settlement, to the Present Date
(Louisville: Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 1886).
6 Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky.  John David Smith critiqued Coulter’s 
interpretation, but he generously concluded that Coulter continued to offer much of value to historians; 
John David Smith, “E. Merton Coulter, the ‘Dunning School,’ and The Civil War and Readjustment in 
Kentucky,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 86 (Spring 1988): 52-69.  The year after Coulter 
published his work, Edward Conrad Smith came to many of the same conclusions; Smith, The Borderland 
in the Civil War (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927).  
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southern and despising the “abolition Yankee.”7  In a thesis accepted by most subsequent 
Kentucky historians, Coulter stated that the policies pursued by the Union army alienated 
the state and caused Kentuckians to shift their allegiances to the South.  Moreover, 
Coulter emphasized the negative effects freedom had on Kentucky’s black population 
and blamed them for post-war violence, sparking W. E. B. Du Bois’s remark that Coulter 
believed “the Negro to be sub-human and congenitally unfitted for citizenship and 
suffrage.”8  Coulter only briefly mentioned Kentucky’s reaction to emancipation and did 
not consider its long term effect on the state’s allegiance to the Lincoln administration 
and the Union.  Since its publication eighty years ago, The Civil War and Readjustment 
in Kentucky has remained the primary study of Kentucky during the Civil War.9  
Only one historian has made a significant rebuttal to Coulter.  In his 1969 article, 
“Kentucky: ‘Pariah Among the Elect’,” Ross A. Webb argued that Kentucky only 
became anti-administration rather than anti-Union.10  Webb helpfully differentiated 
between Kentucky’s pro-southern and pro-Confederate sympathies.  Although Webb 
made reference to Kentucky’s reaction to emancipation, he agreed with Coulter, “A 
greater source of antagonism toward the federal government was the imposition of 
martial law upon Kentucky, under Brigadier General Jeremiah T. Boyle.”11  Webb 
                                               
7 Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky, 17.
8 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a History of the Part which Black 
Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880 (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1935), 731.  Du Bois includes Coulter in a list of historians who fall into the Dunning School.
9 See also Lowell H. Harrison’s short work, The Civil War in Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1975).  While Harrison’s overall interpretation improves on Coulter, the book’s brevity 
undermines its overall success.  
10 Ross A. Webb, “Kentucky: ‘Pariah Among the Elect’,” in Radicalism, Racism, and Party Realignment: 
The Border States during Reconstruction, ed. Richard O. Curry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 
105-45.  Ronald Ray Alexander also addresses emancipation as one of several factors in the ideological 
shift in Kentucky’s Bluegrass region.; Alexander, “The Civil War in Central Kentucky, 1861-1865” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1976), especially 150-92.
11 Webb, “Kentucky,” 109.
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furthered his arguments about Kentucky’s allegiance in the early sections of his book 
Kentucky in the Reconstruction Era (1979).12  
Recent analyses of the state in the Civil War era have been brief and have taken 
few exceptions to Coulter’s interpretation.  One study that has expanded upon Coulter is 
Charles E. Yonkers’s “The Civil War Transformation of George W. Smith: How a 
Western Kentucky Farmer Evolved from Unionist Whig to Pro-Southern Democrat.” 
Although not designed to refute Coulter, Yonkers presented a more nuanced view of 
shifting loyalties in Kentucky.13  Smith, who lived in Henderson County, Kentucky, 
turned against the Union because of a combination of mistreatment at the hands of Union 
soldiers and emancipation policy.  While Yonkers correctly argued that Smith’s shift was 
representative, his focus was not wide enough to support the claim that Smith’s reasons 
for switching sides were similar to those of other Kentuckians.  Like Shaler, Yonkers 
recognized that emancipation had an effect on Kentucky Unionists but did not emphasize 
it sufficiently.   
Benjamin Franklin Cooling’s Fort Donelson’s Legacy: War and Society in 
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863 (1997) is another study that improved upon 
Coulter’s analysis.14  Although Cooling’s primary interest was guerrilla activity and the
move toward “hard war,” he discussed some aspects of social change in Kentucky, 
particularly in the state’s western counties.  One way in which Cooling expanded upon 
The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky was his recognition of disloyal segments of 
                                               
12 Ross A. Webb, Kentucky in the Reconstruction Era (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979).
13 Charles E. Yonkers, “The Civil War Transformation of George W. Smith: How a Western Kentucky 
Farmer Evolved from Unionist Whig to Pro-Southern Democrat,” Register of the Kentucky Historical 
Society 103 (Autumn 2005): 661-690.
14 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Fort Donelson’s Legacy: War and Society in Kentucky and Tennessee, 
1862-1863 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1997).
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the civilian population.  Rather than portraying Union policy toward civilians as the 
persecution of loyal Kentuckians, Cooling showed that Federal commanders faced a very 
real threat from Confederate sympathizers and the guerrillas they supported.  Like Ross 
Webb, Cooling acknowledged Kentucky’s negative reaction to emancipation, but he
continued Coulter’s argument that military mistreatment of civilians was the primary 
factor in Kentucky’s changing allegiance.
The historiography also includes two books concerning Kentucky’s blacks during 
the war.  Both Victor B. Howard’s Black Liberation in Kentucky: Emancipation and 
Freedom, 1862-1884 (1983) and Marion B. Lucas’s A History of Blacks in Kentucky: 
From Slavery to Segregation, 1760-1891 (1992) discuss white reaction to emancipation, 
but their emphasis is on its effects on blacks.15  Howard’s work was the first book-length 
study of emancipation in Kentucky. Although it provided useful information about 
Kentucky’s black population during the period, Black Liberation in Kentucky was more 
descriptive than analytical, which hampered its overall success as a book. Lucas’s work 
is the superior of the two, and even though it only devoted a little more than a chapter to 
the Civil War era, it offered a much richer explanation than Howard of how the war 
affected blacks.  While both works, especially Lucas’s, made contributions to a fuller 
understanding of the Civil War in Kentucky, their goals in writing did not include 
explaining the state’s ideological shift and neither attempted to refute Coulter’s thesis.  
The best synopsis of emancipation in Kentucky comes in The Destruction of Slavery
                                               
15 Victor B. Howard, Black Liberation in Kentucky: Emancipation and Freedom, 1862-1884 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1983); Marion B. Lucas, A History of Blacks in Kentucky, vol. 1, From 
Slavery to Segregation, 1760-1891 (Frankfort: Kentucky Historical Society, 1992).  Darrell E. Bigham also 
studied black life following emancipation, but his emphasis was on the postbellum period rather than the 
process of and reaction to liberation; Bigham, On Jordan’s Banks: Emancipation and Its Aftermath in the 
Ohio River Valley (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).
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(1985), part of the series, Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-
1867.16  In the essay on emancipation in Kentucky, Ira Berlin and his co-editors discussed 
the difficulties Kentucky faced in remaining both pro-Union and proslavery. 
The single best study of white Kentucky’s reaction to emancipation and black 
enlistment is John David Smith’s 1974 article, “The Recruitment of Negro Soldiers in 
Kentucky, 1863-1865.”17  Smith’s article is flawed in that he did not push his research 
into a strong analysis.  However, Smith integrated public policy, white reaction, and the 
black experience into a coherent narrative of this key period in Kentucky’s transition 
away from Unionism.  While he was not explicit about shifting loyalties, he demonstrated 
the extent to which Kentuckians opposed the use of black soldiers.  Also useful is the 
essay on black enlistment in the Border States in The Black Military Experience (1982) 
volume of Freedom.18  In the section on Kentucky, the editors argue that black enlistment 
marked the beginning of the end for slavery in the Commonwealth.
In general, Civil War historians ignore Kentucky, because Kentucky fell in the 
borderland between North and South.  Scholars who study the North during the Civil War
can avoid Kentucky because it was more representative of the South.  Likewise, 
historians of the Confederacy rightly exclude Kentucky because it remained in the Union.  
As a result, Kentucky’s Civil War past has been understudied.  While Civil War 
historiography in general has moved beyond the Dunning school, few studies of 
                                               
16 Ira Berlin, et al., eds., Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series I, vol. 1, 
The Destruction of Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1985), 493-518.
17 John David Smith, “The Recruitment of Negro Soldiers in Kentucky, 1863-1865,” Register of the 
Kentucky Historical Society 72 (Oct. 1974): 364-90.  See also John W. Blassingame, “The Recruitment of 
Colored Troops in Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, 1863-1865,” The Historian 29 (August 1967): 533-
45.
18 Ira Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, eds.  Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 
1861-1867, Series II, The Black Military Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 191-
96.
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Kentucky have advanced beyond Coulter.  The literature on Kentucky during the Civil 
War remains mired in numerous misunderstandings about the state, particularly the 
notion that loyal Kentucky turned against the Union because of their persecution at the 
hands of the Union military.
Still, Coulter was not completely wrong in his analysis of Civil War Kentucky.  
Kentuckians did suffer during the war.  Numerous examples can be found to support 
Coulter’s thesis that the federal military abused Kentucky civilians.  However, the
military’s treatment of Kentuckians was the sole, or even the primary, cause of their 
ideological shift.  In reading letters, diaries, and speeches written by Kentuckians during 
the Civil War, it becomes obvious that while Kentuckians were aware of and concerned 
about military policy, they were more alarmed by emancipation as a Union war goal.  
This thesis argues that emancipation and the subsequent enlistment of black troops 
contributed to Kentucky’s adoption of a southern identity.  While most Kentucky 
Unionists did not become pro-Confederate, many did become pro-southern.  While it is 
difficult to think of the South in the early 1860s without thinking of the Confederacy, 
many Kentuckians in the era did just that.  While Kentucky was politically loyal to the 
Union, Kentucky culture and society resembled that of the disloyal South than that of 
their northern allies.  As a result, Kentuckians were pro-southern culturally and socially, 
while never seceding or following the political lead of the Confederate South.  However, 
because of federal emancipation policy, loyal Kentuckians, like disloyal southerners, lost 
their slaves and by the end of the war, they believed themselves to be in a situation 
similar to that of the former Confederates.  As a result, Kentuckians saw themselves as 
8
more akin to their fellow slaveholders in the South than to the northerners who had 
fought beside them in the Union army for four years.
The first chapter of this thesis provides a narrative of Kentucky’s reaction to 
emancipation policy from John C. Frémont’s proclamation in August 1861 through the 
Thirteenth Amendment which passed Congress in January 1865 and was ratified that 
December.  In the four years from the Union army’s first attack on slavery to the legal 
end of the institution, Kentucky became increasingly aware of and angry about federal 
emancipation policy.  Appreciating the impact of black enlistment on white Kentuckians
is central to understanding their reaction against emancipation.  Some white residents of 
the state, although not many, were willing to accept the end of slavery as a casualty of 
war.  Few, however, could accept the arming of black soldiers, which offended their 
cultural assumptions about race as well as terrified them with the possibility of servile 
insurrection.
Chapters Two through Four are thematic and each deals with a different aspect of 
Kentucky’s response to emancipation.  Chapter Two addresses the constitutional and to a 
lesser extent the legal arguments Kentuckians used in opposing federal policy.  Often, 
they simply proclaimed that measures passed by Congress or imposed by President 
Lincoln were outside the powers delegated by the Constitution and thus unconstitutional.  
Other times they used states’ rights rhetoric, arguing that it was improper for the federal 
government to make such sweeping decisions on matters best left to the states.  Often, 
they put their criticisms in terms of property rights, stating that the government was not 
allowed to seize the property of United States citizens without due process.  Some 
Kentuckians even went so far as to defend the rights of the disloyal southerners as well.
9
Chapter Three analyzes the racial arguments adopted by Kentucky Unionists.  
Slave revolt was preeminent among their concerns.  Drawing upon antebellum fears, 
Kentuckians often warned that emancipation, and especially the arming of black soldiers, 
would spark a race war.  Kentuckians also charged abolitionists with promoting racial 
equality, and once black enlistment began, they argued that allowing African Americans 
to help preserve the Union would degrade whites and elevate blacks.  Finally, Kentucky’s 
proslavery Unionists argued that bondage was the best possible circumstance for blacks.  
Many Kentuckians believed that African Americans would be unable to support 
themselves in freedom because of their innate inferiority.
Chapter Four addresses Kentucky’s economic concerns about emancipation.  As 
soon as northern soldiers moved into Kentucky, slaves began flocking to Union camps, 
seeking refuge and freedom.  The number of runaways only grew as the federal 
government made clear through legislation and presidential proclamation that bondsmen 
were not to be returned to their owners.  Black flight greatly reduced the number of 
slaves held by Kentuckians, and slaveholders suffered economic repercussions caused by 
the loss of capital investment and an inadequate labor pool to sustain the state’s 
agriculture. 
To understand the effects of emancipation and the shifting sentiment in Kentucky, 
the state’s geographic differences must be defined.  Kentucky, like many states, was not 
politically or economically homogenous in the 1860s.  The southwest part of Kentucky 
and the counties surrounding Lexington were more southern in their sympathies than the 
rest of the state.  Eastern Kentucky, like most southern Appalachian areas, was 
predominantly Unionist, as were the river cities of Louisville and Covington.  Much of 
10
the rest of the state from the edge of the Jackson Purchase to the Appalachian foothills 
had both Unionists and secessionists, although loyal men and women made up the 
majority.  The economic impact of slavery is the key to understanding these regional 
differences.  The slave population was greatest around Lexington and in the Jackson 
Purchase.19  As a result, these two areas were more heavily pro-Confederate than the rest 
of the state.  On the other hand, eastern Kentuckians owned fewer slaves than any other 
region and was overwhelmingly Unionist.  The areas along the Ohio River, particularly 
Louisville and the towns across from Cincinnati in northern Kentucky, had economic ties 
to the North and were less dependent on slave powered agriculture.  Thus, they were two 
of the strongest Unionist areas of the state.  Despite the regional differences in Kentucky, 
the state as a whole rejected federal plans for emancipation.  
Kentucky failed in its attempts to maintain both the Union and slavery, and as a 
result, many of the state’s Unionists found themselves in sympathy with the defeated 
Confederacy.  While the military treatment of civilians played a role in the Kentucky’s 
shift toward a pro-South sentiment, historians have overstated its importance for more 
than one hundred years.  Instead, Emancipation is the key to understanding the state’s 
changing allegiances.  By 1862, Kentucky’s northern allies could not abide the continued 
existence of human bondage in the South.  Yet, while Kentuckians continued to hope for
the perpetuation of slavery in their state if not in the South as a whole.  From the 
Confiscation Acts through the Emancipation Proclamation and the founding of the United 
States Colored Troops, Kentuckians fought a losing battle against black freedom.  The
                                               
19 See statistics in Kenneth H. Williams and James Russell Harris, eds., “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical 
Overview,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 103 (Autumn 2005): 745
11
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865 left them embittered over 
the demise of slavery.
12
CHAPTER I
THE UNIONIST RESPONSE TO EMANCIPATION
From the beginning of the Civil War through the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in December 1865, Kentuckians opposed all federal efforts at emancipation.  
Indeed, the state’s attachment to slavery was so strong that emancipation and the 
enlistment of black soldiers turned Kentuckians against the Lincoln administration and in 
some cases even the Union.  Beginning with General John C. Frémont’s 1861 
proclamation freeing the slaves of Missouri rebels and continuing through the 
Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862, the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation and the 
enlistment of African American soldiers, this chapter traces the response of Kentuckians 
as they found themselves caught between their support for the Union and their desire to 
keep slaves.  By the end of 1865, federal emancipation policy pushed white Kentuckians 
to adopt the pro-southern ideology that defined the state for the rest of the nineteenth 
century.
United States Senator Garrett Davis is a prime example of a Kentuckian who 
began as a staunch Unionist but by war’s end was a vocal critic of the Republican-led 
government.  By 1864, Davis, whom historian E. Merton Coulter described as one who 
early in the war “allowed no one’s zeal for the Union to exceed his own,” turned against 
13
the Republican prosecution of the war, in part because of the changing federal war goals.1  
In January of that year, Davis proposed eighteen resolutions in the Senate condemning 
the Lincoln government and recommending that “the people North and the people South 
ought to revolt against their war leaders and take this great matter into their own hands.”2  
Davis also became an outspoken opponent of every piece of antislavery legislation that 
came through the Senate.  Although most Kentucky Unionists only turned against the 
Lincoln administration politically, some Kentuckians went so far as to support the 
Confederacy.  A slaveholding Unionist from southwestern Kentucky, Ellen McGaughey 
Wallace opposed the federal government by late 1862 and what had become, she 
correctly perceived, a war for abolition.  For much of the rest of the war, she condemned 
every move of the Lincoln administration and in April 1865, she lamented the surrender 
of Robert E. Lee at Appomattox.  An avid diarist, Wallace spent much of the war 
recording her anti-Lincoln and anti-Union sentiments.3  Her shift in loyalty was not 
unique.  Bevie Cain of Breckinridge County wrote in 1863, “Northerners are . . . for 
nothing but the abolition of slavery.  I was for the Union myself until this fact became 
evident.”4  Although Wallace and Cain represent an extreme view, many Kentuckians 
questioned and changed their loyalties because of emancipation.  
In 1860 and 1861, most Kentuckians opposed both secession and abolition.  The 
fact that the state first declared neutrality and then sided with the Union indicates their 
opposition to secession.  Moreover, more than two-thirds of Kentucky’s Civil War 
                                               
1 E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1926; reprint, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966), 268.
2 Ibid., 208-9; Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st session, 96-7.
3 Ellen McGaughey Wallace Diary, 1861-1865, Wallace-Starling Family Diaries, Kentucky Historical 
Society, Frankfort, KY.  Hereafter cited as Wallace Diary, [date], Wallace-Starling Family Diaries-KHS.
4 Bevie Cain to James M. Davis, 10 January 1863, Bevie Cain Letters, Manuscripts, Kentucky Building, 
Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, Ky.
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soldiers enlisted to protect the Union.5  Kentuckians had a long tradition of supporting the 
Union in the face of threats of secession from their fellow southerners.  Most famously, 
Henry Clay sought compromise between North and South over Missouri in 1820, 
nullification in 1833, and a number of issues in the early 1850s.6  Clay’s ideological 
descendant, John J. Crittenden, unsuccessfully attempted to prevent war during the 
secession winter with a series of compromise amendments to the Constitution.7  
Throughout the antebellum period, Kentuckians showed that they were devoted to both 
the Union and slavery, and into the war years, they believed that they could support both 
simultaneously.
However, Kentucky Unionists were also advocates of slavery.  As historian 
Harold D. Tallant argued, the state Constitution of 1850 effectively ended Kentucky’s 
debate over slavery.8  After the passage of the new constitution, most Kentuckians 
believed that slavery had become a permanent fixture in the state.  Emancipationist 
Cassius M. Clay moved on to national politics, and a proslavery mob ran abolitionist 
John G. Fee out of the state in January 1860.  Others, like Robert J. Breckinridge, took 
the Constitution of 1850 as the final word on the matter and halted their efforts to end 
                                               
5 Historians debate the exact numbers for Kentuckians who served in the war.Ross A. Webb gives the 
numbers as 64,000 Union soldiers versus 30,000 Confederates.  Lowell H. Harrison stated that Kentucky 
produced over 90,000 Union soldiers, which grows to over 100,000 if Home Guards are included, 
compared to somewhere between 25,000 and 40,000 Kentucky Confederates.  Regardless, the figures are at 
least two-thirds Union and one-third Confederate.  Ross A. Webb, Kentucky in the Reconstruction Era
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979), 9; Lowell H. Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky
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slavery.  By the 1860 election of Lincoln and the 1861 firing on Fort Sumter, antislavery 
sentiment in Kentucky had, for all practical purposes, vanished. In September 1861, 
Joshua F. Speed wrote to Lincoln about the support for slavery in Kentucky, stating, “So 
fixed is public sentiment in this state against freeing negroes & allowing negroes to be 
emancipated & remain among us – That you had as well attack the freedom of worship in 
the north or the right of a parent to teach his child to read.”9  Unlike northerners who had 
the dual goal of preserving the Union and ending slavery, Kentuckians saw no connection 
between the two objectives.  
Support for both the Union and slavery led Kentuckians to find a middle ground 
between the northern abolitionists and the southern fire-eaters.  The conservative 
Unionism that they adopted was similar to the platform of Northern Democrats, who 
supported the war but opposed all efforts at abolition.  Kentucky’s dual opposition to 
secession and abolition was so representative of conservative Unionism that when the 
National Conservative Union Committee met in December 1863 they adopted the 
“Kentucky Platform,” pledging opposition to radicals in both the North and the South.10  
Indeed, many Kentucky Unionists loathed both secessionists and abolitionists. Senator 
Garrett Davis so despised both groups that he recommended the best way to end the war 
was to take one hundred secessionist leaders and one hundred abolitionist leaders and 
“hang them in pairs at the ends of the same rope.”11  When Senator Morton S. Wilkinson 
of Minnesota later pressed him on the issue, Davis replied, “[I]f I had the power to-night I 
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would do the same, and among them I would hang the Senator from Minnesota.”12  In 
1864, writing from Bourbon County, L. G. Ray proclaimed, “It sounds very well to say, 
that after the rebellion is put down, we will turn our attention to the radical abolitionists 
& settle them.”13 Often, Kentucky’s congressional delegation blamed the war on fanatics 
in both the North and the South.  Representative Aaron Harding made this point,
condemning “the leading disunion abolitionists of the North” for their role in “plunging 
this great country into all the horrors of civil war and bloodshed.”14
Kentuckians also feared that emancipation would inhibit the war effort.  Debating 
emancipation in Congress, Harding predicted, “Who ever lives to see that fearful and 
mad policy inaugurated, will see the sun of American liberty go down in clouds and 
darkness to rise no more.”15  He continued, “The last hope of a restoration of the Union –
the last hope of free government on this continent – will then sink and utterly perish.”  
Speaking about the Thirteenth Amendment three and a half years later, Representative 
Robert Mallory proclaimed, “You have changed your whole policy in regard to the war.  
You have converted it from a war to preserve the Union, as you acknowledge and boldly 
declare, into a war for the abolition of slavery, because you say it is the only way to 
preserve the Union.”  As a result, Mallory stated, “You have united the people of the 
southern States in solid phalanx and divided the people of the North, and alienated to a 
great extent the people of States who were almost undivided at the commencement of the 
war.”16
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In 1861, Kentuckians contemplated secession, fearing the course the Republican 
administration might pursue regarding slavery.  Although Kentucky chose to remain in 
the Union, federal officials realized the state’s fragile loyalty.  Throughout the early 
months of the war, Lincoln and others in Washington appreciated Kentucky’s attachment 
to slavery.  In August 1861, when General John C. Frémont issued his proclamation 
freeing the slaves of Missouri rebels, Unionists in Kentucky appealed to Lincoln, fearing 
that a delay in the president’s condemnation would cause irreparable damage to the 
state’s support for the administration.  In September 1861, Joshua F. Speed, a stanch 
Kentucky Unionist and friend of Lincoln, discussed Frémont’s proclamation with the 
president, writing, “I have just seen Fremonts proclamation – it will hurt us in Ky.”17  
Two days later, Speed wrote that he had been so “distressed” about Frémont’s “foolish 
proclamation” that he had been “unable to eat or sleep.”18  Speed believed that any move 
toward emancipation would “crush out every vestage of a union party” in Kentucky.  
Knowing Speed had the ear of the president, a group of Kentucky Unionists wrote him a 
one sentence telegram: “There is not a day to lose in disavowing emancipation or 
Kentucky is gone over the mill dam.”19  With Kentucky on his mind, Lincoln ordered 
Frémont to revise his proclamation so that it was less offensive to Unionists in the Border 
States.
In December 1861, a subordinate once again undermined Lincoln’s moderate 
course on emancipation when, in his annual report, Secretary of War Simon Cameron 
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urged emancipation and the recruitment of black soldiers.20  When the report came to his 
attention, Lincoln, well aware of the tenuous loyalty of the Border States, demanded that 
all of the copies be seized and that the offending language be removed.  The Kentucky 
General Assembly went so far as to demand Cameron’s removal as Secretary of War.21  
At this point Lincoln publicly opposed emancipation, much less the arming of freedmen, 
but some Kentuckians believed the Secretary of War’s report reflected Lincoln’s 
sentiments. On December 15, Ellen McGaughey Wallace wrote, “This day President 
Lincoln’s message has been received and filled the hearts of all loyal citizens with 
disappointment, shame and indignation, arming and emancipating the slaves seems to be 
contemplated . . ..”22  In general, however, Kentuckians received solace from Lincoln’s 
condemnation of Cameron’s report.  
The period from December 1861 to September 1862 witnessed a number of 
sudden changes in federal policy toward slaves.  By early 1862, despite worries about the 
Border States, Lincoln believed his political support across the Union was strong enough 
to sustain adding emancipation as a war goal.23  On March 11, Congress passed, despite 
resistance from Kentucky’s representatives, a resolution urging the government to instate 
a plan of compensated emancipation.  By the summer of 1862, Lincoln was ready to 
approach the Border State, and in July, he offered the Border States a plan for gradual, 
compensated emancipation.  Lincoln argued that emancipation in the Border States would 
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end the Confederacy’s hope of support from the loyal slaveholding states.24  By ending 
slavery along the border, the Confederacy would realize that it was on its own and would 
soon collapse. If the Border States did not accept compensation for their slaves, Lincoln 
warned, they would be left with nothing once the war destroyed the institution of slavery 
through “friction and abrasion.” Moreover, Lincoln promised that the freedmen would be 
colonized in the Deep South. In response to Lincoln’s proposal, seven Kentucky 
Congressmen and one Senator wrote to the president explaining that they opposed the 
measure for constitutional and financial reasons.25  They believed the president did not 
have the power to authorize such a measure and that the government could not provide
the necessary funds.  Even gradual emancipation complete with compensation and 
colonization was unappealing to the Kentuckians who expected to maintain their slave 
property in spite of the effects of the war.
The Confiscation Acts also proved to be a delicate issue in Kentucky.  The First 
Confiscation Act of August 1861 generated some controversy in the state, but not to the 
extent of other measures.26  Tellingly, Kentucky rescinded its position of neutrality well 
after the passage of the First Confiscation Act.   Some Unionists protested the law, but 
others saw it as a justifiable war measure. Kentuckian Joseph Holt explained that the 
state’s loyal men had accepted the law because it limited confiscation to slaves employed 
in the Confederate war effort and did not give the confiscated chattel their freedom.27  
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Holt stated that Kentuckians recognized the Confiscation Act as part of Lincoln’s 
“conservative policy . . . upon this delicate & perplexing question.” On July 17, 1862, 
Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act.  Unlike the first act, the second 
engendered strong opposition in Kentucky. The Louisville Daily Democrat, which had 
supported the First Confiscation Act, spoke out against the second because its provisions 
encouraged emancipation.28  On the floor of the Senate, Lazarus W. Powell of Kentucky 
stated that the bill would not “meet the approval of one man in five thousand in any slave 
State of the Union.”29  Powell also warned that the bill would make “many, now friendly, 
enemies to this Union.”30 In the House of Representatives, John C. Crittenden 
condemned the act as unconstitutional and “perfectly fatal to this republic.”31  When the 
final bill came to a vote in the House and the Senate, seven Kentucky representatives and 
both senators voted against the measure.
On the same day Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act, it also accepted a 
revised version of the Militia Act of 1795.  The revision sanctioned the enlistment of 
black troops “for the purpose of constructing entrenchments, or performing camp service, 
or any other labor, or any military or naval purpose for which they may be found 
competent.”32  Moreover, the act freed blacks who enlisted but still belonged to disloyal 
masters.  In the Senate, Garrett Davis spoke out against the act stating that while he 
would welcome black laborers for the war effort he would never support the use of 
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African American soldiers.33  He argued that the use of black troops degraded whites in 
the military, and he asserted that a thousand Kentuckians out of a thousand agreed with 
him.  Kentucky Senator Lazarus W. Powell criticized the bill as an attack on private 
property, turning the army into a band of “national plunderers.” 34  Powell warned that 
“all Christendom” would condemn the law as “harsh, brutal, and cruel.”  Despite the 
lamenting and hand-wringing of Kentucky’s representatives, the bill passed both houses 
with little difficulty.35
On September 22, 1862, believing in the necessity of emancipation, Lincoln 
issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.  Kentuckians, particularly those in the 
Bluegrass, made little mention of the document.  The Union victory at Antietam Creek in 
Maryland, which gave Lincoln the confidence to issue the proclamation, repulsed one 
part of a two-pronged Confederate offensive.  As Lincoln made his announcement, the 
western Confederate army was moving through eastern Kentucky, and distracted white 
Kentuckians paid little attention to political statements from Washington.  Although 
many of the state’s residents later recorded their views on emancipation, in September 
and October 1862, most concerned themselves with the Confederate army.  In western 
Kentucky, however, the Confederate threat was less worrisome, and Ellen Wallace wrote 
in her diary, “Lincoln’s proclamation emancipating all the slaves is justly created great 
indignation.”  Wallace continued that the “wretch [Lincoln] ought to suffer all the 
torments that could be inflicted on him, body and soul.”36  By December 1862, Wallace 
believed that Lincoln deserved impeachment and imprisonment in a dungeon for the rest 
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of “his miserable life.”37  Although she had been a strong Unionist through the first 
eighteen months of the war, Wallace, like many Kentuckians, turned against the Lincoln 
administration as emancipation became a war goal.  
When the Confederate threat subsided, more Kentuckians registered their 
complaints about Lincoln’s plan to emancipate southern slaves.  In November, the editor 
of the Frankfort Tri-Weekly Commonwealth proclaimed that “the President’s nigger 
proclamation ought to be shoved down his throat.”38  On December 26, John B. Bibb of 
Frankfort wrote, “I think Mr. Lincoln is about to commit a great blunder.  I do not think 
the proclamation will have the happy effect he anticipates, probably the contrary.”39  
Although Bibb stated that he would voluntarily free his slaves if it would end the 
rebellion, he was part of a small minority willing to sacrifice the peculiar institution for 
the sake of the Union.  By the end of 1862, Kentucky’s opposition to the proclamation 
had reached such levels that military commanders in the state feared secession in the new 
year.  On December 30, General Horatio G. Wright, commander of the Department of 
Ohio, wrote to General Henry W. Halleck about his concerns.40  Wright feared that when 
Lincoln issued his proclamation, the Kentucky legislature, with Governor James F. 
Robinson’s approval, would pass an ordinance of secession.  To counter any possible 
rebellious action Wright ordered additional units of artillery, cavalry, and infantry to 
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report to Kentucky from Ohio and western Virginia.41  Although Wright overreacted, his
concern indicates the extent to which Kentuckians disapproved of the measure.  
Although he did not advocate secession as Wright expected, Governor Robinson 
issued a harsh rebuke of the Lincoln administration in his 1863 annual message to the 
legislature.  Covering most of the arguments Kentuckians used to oppose emancipation, 
Robinson argued that “this monstrous doctrine” violated the constitutions of both 
Kentucky and the United States, complained that it would unify the South “into one 
burning mass of inextinguishable hate,” and lamented the free blacks created by the 
order.42  Robinson believed that the Union must be preserved but only within the bounds 
of the Constitution.  The governor stated, “If military necessity is not to be measured by 
constitutional limits, we are no longer a free people.” Robinson also feared that
emancipation would reinforce Confederate suspicions of the dark intentions of the 
Republican administration and would crush any hope of restoring the Union.  Finally, 
Robinson feared that the freedmen would rise up and slaughter the white population of 
the South.  Even if by some chance servile insurrection was avoided, Robinson doubted 
blacks and whites could live together.  The Kentucky legislature voted to send the 
President a copy of Robinson’s anti-emancipation statements.43  
Numerous Kentuckians echoed the governor’s sentiments.  In January, the editors
of the Louisville Weekly Journal voiced the opinions of many across the state.44  
Although believing the Emancipation Proclamation to be a “dead letter,” the Journal
condemned it as a “power for evil.”  The newspaper feared that it would strengthen the 
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Confederacy and tear apart the North, all without carrying out what it proposed.  Even if 
they believed the proclamation was impotent, Kentuckians understood what it 
represented.  On January 2, 1863, Louisvillian John F. Jefferson wrote, “Lincoln’s 
emancipation proclamation . . . shows beyond doubt that Lincoln is an abolitionist of the 
deepest dye.  I unhesitatingly condemn this proclamation.”45  John E. Records wrote to 
Kentucky legislator E. Hubbard Smith, stating, “I am for the Constitution, the Union, and 
the Enforcement of the laws.  I am down on the Abolition-Republican rabble with all the 
energy I possess.”46  Union soldier John T. Harrington remarked, “I enlisted to fight for 
the Union and the Constitution but Lincoln puts a different construction on things and
now has us Union men fighting for his Abolition Platform and thus making us a hord 
[sic] of Subjugators, house burners, negro thieves, and devastators of private property.”47
Kentucky slaves fled from their masters since the Union army first arrived in the
state, and black flight increased once Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation.  
The President’s statements clarified Union policy toward runaways and gave African 
Americans more confidence that soldiers would not turn them away from their lines.  
Union soldiers, increasingly equating slaveholding with disloyalty, did little to dissuade 
blacks from seeking refuge with them.  The troops often gave them shelter and prevented 
their re-enslavement.48  
Kentucky slaveholders, on the other hand, did all they could to prevent escapes
and to reclaim those who made it to Union lines.  A common method of thwarting 
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runaways was to arrest them.  Under Kentucky law, captured fugitive slaves were 
advertised and if no one came forward to claim them, the sheriff sold them at auction.  
However, many of the African Americans arrested as runaways were actually freedmen 
who had fled the South after being emancipated by the Second Confiscation Act or 
Lincoln’s proclamation.  In October 1862, many soldiers in the invading Confederate 
army brought servants, many of whom were left behind as the rebels retreated.49  These 
former slaves had been freed under the Second Confiscation Act, but Kentuckians 
captured them and sold them back into slavery.  In March 1863, the Kentucky General 
Assembly passed legislation forbidding freedmen from the entering the state.  Those who 
were caught would be “disposed of as runaways.”50 By April 1863, General Ambrose 
Burnside was so concerned about the enslavement of freedmen that he issued General 
Orders, No. 53, which forbade the practice.51  Yet, the re-enslavement did not stop.  Amy 
Moore, a freedwoman from Alabama, informed the Freedmen’s Bureau that in the 
summer of 1863, she, her mother, and three of her sisters were arrested in Louisville after
leaving the Deep South.52  The Bullitt County sheriff imprisoned them and then auctioned 
them off.
Kentuckians also worked to recover slaves who flocked to military encampments. 
Smith D. Atkins, Colonel of the 92nd Illinois Infantry, described slaveholders’ efforts to 
reclaim contraband attached to his regiment.  Atkins wrote, “At Winchester I was 
threatened by a mob, and some of the 14th Ky. Infy. tried to take by force, servants from 
my lines, while marching along.”  As a result, his regiment thought it necessary to go 
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through town “with bayonets fixed and guns loaded,” in order to stave off attack.53  
General Gordon Granger, commander of the Army of Kentucky, reported that he had 
received numerous complaints from Kentuckians whose slaves were protected by out of 
state regiments.54  Charles S. Rogers of the 10th Kentucky Cavalry asked Granger for 
some assurance that his soldiers’ slaves would be protected while they were off fighting 
the Confederates.55  The state’s courts also worked to protect slave property, as judges 
indicted officers who commanded regiments that harbored fugitive slaves.
One of the more famous such incidents is the case of Judge George Robertson.  In 
November 1862, Robertson met with Colonel William L. Utley of the 22nd Wisconsin 
Infantry to reclaim one of his slaves, a young male, who was in the Nicholasville camp of 
Utley’s regiment.56  Although Utley did not forbid Robertson from taking the boy, he 
refused to deliver him to Robertson and did nothing to stop his men from interfering.  
When Robertson was unable to take the slave, he had Utley indicted for violating state 
laws regarding fugitive slaves.  Both Utley and Robertson appealed to President Lincoln 
for aid.  Lincoln refused to return the slave to Robertson, instead offering to pay the judge 
$500 if he would turn the boy over to Utley.  Robertson refused, hoping to test the 
constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation.  What happened to the slave in 
question is unknown, but in 1871, the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin awarded $908.06 to Robertson.57  
Union commanders in state worked to alleviate strife between Union soldiers and 
Kentucky civilians.  In the fall of 1862, General Jeremiah T. Boyle, commander of the 
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District of Western Kentucky and a native Kentuckian, issued an order forbidding “negro 
slaves” from entering military camps and expelling those already in Union lines.58  
Likewise, General Q. A. Gillmore, who headed the Army of Kentucky’s Second 
Division, forbade the presence of African Americans in the camps of his soldiers.59  The 
changing nature of the war, however, precluded continued preferential treatment for 
Kentucky slaveholders.  By the summer of 1863, Union commanders in Kentucky fell in 
line with the policy laid out by the Lincoln administration and ordered the impressments 
of black laborers.60  
Yet, nothing infuriated Kentuckians more than the enlistment of black troops.  As 
early as 1861, Kentucky’s residents feared that the Lincoln administration would arm 
African Americans, both free and enslaved, as part of the war effort against the 
Confederacy.  Kentuckians’ criticisms of Secretary of War Cameron’s 1861 annual report 
expressed their anxiety about the use of black soldiers and emancipation.61  The July 
1862 Militia Act raised further fears, which the Emancipation Proclamation confirmed at 
the end of the year.  Although Kentucky was at first exempted from black enlistment, it 
was not long before recruiters began operating in the state.
In June 1863, Colonel James B. Fry, Provost-Marshal-General of the United 
States Army, authorized the enlistment of Kentucky’s free blacks but not the state’s 
slaves, believing that to be less offensive to Kentuckians.  However, he was mistaken;
Kentuckians opposed the use of all black soldiers, not just former bondsmen.  Brigadier 
General Jeremiah T. Boyle, a native Kentuckian and commanding officer of the state, 
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wrote to Fry warning him of his error.62  Boyle cautioned Fry that at most he would gain 
seven hundred black soldiers but he would lose ten thousand additional white recruits as 
he would “revolutionize the State.”  Moreover, Boyle believed that no “honest, loyal man 
in the State” was in favor of the measure and that the army would meet with “decided 
opposition.”  Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, stationed in Cincinnati, also warned 
of the dangers of enlisting Kentucky’s black population.  In June 1863, he wrote to 
President Lincoln, “I sincerely hope the enrollment may be stopped.”63  A brief cessation 
lasted six months.  
Kentucky civilians, politicians, soldiers, and newspaper editors all condemned the 
federal plans for black enlistment even when their state was exempt.  Their denunciations
only increased as recruiters entered the state.  In January 1864, Union recruiters began 
operating in Paducah.  When he learned of black recruitment in southwestern Kentucky, 
Governor Bramlette wrote to President Lincoln condemning the action, arguing that the 
enlistment of freedmen in Kentucky, a loyal state, was illegal.  “The rebellious States and 
districts,” he continued, should be treated as “belligerants,” not enjoying the rights and 
legal position of loyal states.  In those areas, Bramlette believed, the federal government 
had the power to recruit black troops because of “the laws of Nations.”  However, 
Lincoln did not have the authority to recruit African Americans in loyal states as part of 
the militia.  Bramlette believed that blacks did not meet the citizenship requirements to 
qualify for militia duty.  However, his protest fell on deaf federal ears, and by March, 
recruiting stations had opened across the state.64
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Kentucky’s Unionist newspapers too opposed the recruitment and use of black 
troops.65  Editors from Louisville, Lexington, Frankfort, and towns across the state all 
voiced their dissent. Newspaper editors George D. Prentice and Albert G. Hodges were 
both longtime advocates of the Union, but they condemned the Lincoln administration for
its use of black soldiers.  In the Louisville Journal Prentice criticized Washington and 
expressed doubts that blacks were capable of serving in the military.  Moreover, he 
argued that black recruitment was an abolitionist scheme to “subjugate the South.”66  
Hodges, editor of the Frankfort Commonwealth, characterized black enlistment as 
“insane.”67  The opinions of these two staunch Union men were characteristic of 
sentiment around the state.
Indeed, many of Kentucky’s prominent Unionists vehemently opposed what they 
considered an appalling policy.  Colonel Frank L. Wolford of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry 
was a well-respected Union officer until the spring of 1864.  Having enlisted early in the 
war, Wolford fought at the Battle of Mill Springs in January 1862 and then gained 
renown as he battled Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan across the state.68  On March 
10, 1864, shortly after recruitment began across the state, Unionists in Fayette County
rewarded Wolford’s service, offering him gifts and inviting him to speak in Lexington.  
In his address, Wolford harshly criticized Lincoln’s emancipation policy, stating that the 
President was guilty of “trampling upon the Constitution” and in “violation of the rules of 
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civilized warfare.”69  To the military commanders of Kentucky, Wolford crossed the line 
when he encouraged “forcible resistance” to the recruitment of blacks.70  On June 27, 
army officials arrested Wolford and charged him with treason before dishonorably 
discharging him.  Lieutenant Governor Richard T. Jacob also denounced black 
recruitment, often joining Wolford at public formums, and was briefly banished to the 
Confederacy.71  In Kentucky, Wolford and Jacob received loud applause for their stance 
against the administration.  Historian Hambleton Tapp stated that after his dismissal, 
Wolford became “the most popular man in Kentucky.”72  In early April 1864, Ann Clay 
informed her husband, Brutus, of reports that Wolford had spoken before “a delighted 
audience” in Paris, Kentucky.73  Later that month, Brutus’s son Sidney wrote to him that 
“the gallant Wolford is now the most popular man in our part of the state.”74  Sidney 
continued that Lincoln, on the other hand, was “universally condemned for his tyranical 
course” in dishonorably discharging Wolford.  Captain James M. Fidler reported that 
when Wolford and Jacob spoke near Lebanon in May 1864 they “so infuriated the people 
that the Board of Enrolment could not have remained in Lebanon but for the presence of 
Federal bayonets.”75  The outcry of support for Wolford indicates the deep seated 
opposition to black soldiers.
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United States Congressman Brutus J. Clay also opposed and, less conspicuously, 
resisted black recruitment.  Although the owner of over 130 slaves in 1860, Clay 
supported the Union cause.76  The brother of Cassius M. Clay, an emancipationist and 
Lincoln’s ambassador to Russia, Brutus had ties to some of the strongest Unionists in the 
country.  His support of the Union, however, did not extend to the enlistment of African 
American soldiers.  Throughout the first session of the 38th Congress, beginning in 
December 1863, Clay denounced plans for black recruitment as a violation of property 
rights and a harbinger of “civil war among us [the population of Kentucky].”77  
Moreover, he believed Lincoln’s policies would “crush out the Union sentiment” in 
Kentucky and leave a disloyal populace.  In his personal life, Clay also resisted the 
enrollment of black troops.  Clay stated that he would tell his slaves that the Union army 
only wanted them so they could be killed off by “hard work & exposure & in battle in 
place of those cowardly scoundrels from the North.”78  Clay even claimed that he would 
urge his slaves to runaway rather than enlist.  In an effort to deter the recruiters who
began to visit his plantation near Paris, Kentucky, Clay told his wife to act ignorant when 
asked about their slaves.79  In August 1864, after the military took two of his slaves, 
allegedly under the age of eighteen, Clay wrote to Major General Stephen Gano 
Burbridge, Commander of the Department of Kentucky, requesting that they be returned 
to him.80  While Clay never took actions as drastic as those of Wolford and Jacob, his 
opposition to black soldiers speaks to white discontent with the enlistment process.  
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Wolford, Jacob, and Clay were only some of the more prominent examples of 
Kentucky’s opposition to the recruitment of African American troops.  White 
Kentuckians from all classes and regions criticized the use of black soldiers.  Benjamin S. 
Jones, a Kentucky corporal from Barren County, vehemently opposed the use of black 
recruits.  In February 1864, he wrote that he had seen a regiment of black troops in 
Tennessee and that he did not want to see any more.  He continued, “I reckon that the 
negros will be freed before this war is ended and then old abe lincoln will be satisfied[.]  I 
wish that he had to Sleep with a negro every night as long as he lives and kiss ones ass 
twice a day.”81  Jones’s brother, William, told his parents that he had heard blacks were 
being recruited in Kentucky and that if the government wanted him “to fight they had 
Better keep the negroes Back.”82  
Going beyond verbal opposition, many were willing to violently attack blacks in 
order to curb enlistment.  In June 1865, Captain James M. Fidler, the Provost Marshal of 
the 4th District of Kentucky, filed his final report about black enlistment.83  Stationed in 
Lebanon, Fidler commented on violence toward African American recruits in the area 
during the summer of 1864.  He told of seventeen slaves from Green County, who after 
they attempted to enlist, were attacked by a “mob of young men of Lebanon” who 
“seized them and whipped them most unmercifully with cow-hides.”  Fidler reported 
numerous other assaults, whippings, and murders of black recruits and white recruiters.  
As a result of the violence, Fidler recounted that it became “absolutely necessary for the 
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protection of the slave to enlist him without the consent of the owner.”84  In June 1864,
Lorenzo Thomas, the Adjutant General of the army, recognizing the difficulties recruiters 
faced, issued General Orders No. 20, which stated that “all who present themselves for 
enlistment will be received and enlisted into the service of the United States,” even 
without the permission from their owners.85  This document, echoing an earlier edict 
issued by the Provost Marshal General of Kentucky, caused outrage among the state’s
white population, which continued to commit violent acts against black recruits. 
The outrage over black troops continued after the war.  Because units were 
mustered out in order of seniority, many of the USCT regiments were the last to be 
discharged.  By September 1865, almost eleven thousand Union soldiers remained in 
Kentucky, all of them black.86  Robert A. Nelson from Mercer County complained about 
black troops in the state to his son, Frank, who served with the 21st Kentucky Infantry.  
After the war, much to his father’s chagrin, Frank Nelson’s regiment was sent to Texas.  
Believing his son should have already been discharged, Robert wrote, “If it is the policy 
of the Rulers to hold a standing army in the field and upon the Frontier why don’ they put 
our Black soldiers in that position – They are not needed here – They are a nuisance.”87  
Sarcastically, Robert continued, “[A]nd if the extravagant eulogy bestowed so lavishly 
upon these Black warriors is to be credited they are the very men for the occasion for 
frontier service.”  When the War Department did discharge USCT regiments, white 
Kentuckians made it difficult for black veterans to assimilate into civilian life.  General 
Clinton B. Fisk, head of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Kentucky and Tennessee, reported 
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that the veterans were often “scourged, beaten, shot at, and driven from their homes and 
families.”88
Kentucky’s final stand against emancipation was its opposition to the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  From April 1864, when the amendment received its first debate in the 
Senate, to January 1865, when it passed both houses, most of Kentucky’s congressional 
delegation worked to prevent its passage.  Among the amendment’s supporters were 
Representative George H. Yeaman, who realized that blocking the amendment would do 
little to preserve slavery in Kentucky, and Green Clay Smith, a former Union general and 
an Unconditional Unionist representative, who hoped in would establish peace in the 
state by removing the divisive issue of slavery.89  Most of Kentucky’s representatives, 
however, opposed the amendment just as they had the Confiscation Acts, the Militia Act, 
and other emancipation legislation.  Senator Garrett Davis was so angered by the 
amendment that he proposed a counter amendment that would re-form the six New 
England states into two larger states.90  Robert Mallory, a Unionist Representative, feared 
that adoption of the amendment would mark “a radical change of the Government of the 
United States.”91  Mallory believed that the change in the Constitution would improperly 
redistribute power so that the federal government would be superior to the states.  Brutus 
Clay argued that the amendment unfairly punished Kentucky.  He portrayed the state as a 
victim that had supported the Union throughout the war only to be penalized at the end.92  
The arguments of these Kentuckians did little to curb pro-emancipation sentiment in 
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Congress, and the amendment received approval from the necessary two-thirds majority 
in the House on January 31.
When Congress sent the Thirteenth Amendments to the states in January 1865, 
Governor Bramlette encouraged the Kentucky General Assembly to ratify it.  Bramlette, 
like many Kentuckians, believed slavery to be “irrevocably doomed to speedy 
extermination.”93  Still, Bramlette hoped that Kentucky would receive compensation from 
Congress for the slaves freed by the amendment and suggested ratification on the 
condition that the state’s slaveholders receive $34 million from the federal government.94
To make the motion more acceptable to conservatives in the state legislature, a moderate 
faction proposed that freed slaves be given the same rights as free-born blacks, who 
under the Kentucky constitution had no social or political rights and few civil rights.95  In 
February, despite the proposals intended to appease conservatives, the Kentucky House 
of Representatives voted 56-28 to reject the amendment and the state senate did the same 
by a vote of 21-13.96  The legislature refused to accept the amendment even after it 
became part of the United States Constitution in December 1865.   
Before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, many white Kentuckians
realized that slavery would end with the war.  However, they remained as angry about it 
in 1865 as they had been on January 1, 1863.  In protest, they turned against the 
Republican administration and in some cases even the Union.  Though most Kentuckians 
who turned against the Lincoln administration did not become Confederate sympathizers, 
a number of Kentucky Unionists were so repulsed by federal policy toward African 
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Americans that by the end of the war they commiserated with the defeated Confederates.  
On April 14, 1865, Ellen Wallace remarked, “The Confederacy has gone down.  What 
will become of the fragments?  Will they be again united in one glorious bond that has 
been purified by fire and blood never more to be severed, forever one and the same in 
prosperity and honor?  Or shall the bayonet of a tryant [sic] pin them together in the 
bonds of eternal revenge and hate.”97  Only a few Kentucky Unionists lamented the 
collapse of the Confederacy as Wallace did, but many of them showed their political 
transformation in the years following the war.  Kentucky was among the first of the 
southern states to restore rights to Confederate veterans, and by the end of the 1860s, 
former rebels controlled the state’s government.  What had turned Kentucky against the 
Lincoln administration was anger over federal emancipation policy and the enlistment 
and use of black troops.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO EMANCIPATION
On January 8, 1863, Kentucky Governor James F. Robinson submitted his annual 
message to the state legislature.  Given the reaction of white Kentuckians to emancipation 
it is not surprising that Robinson responded to the Emancipation Proclamation, issued 
only a week earlier.  Robinson used a variety of arguments to denounce emancipation, the 
proclamation, and the public policy.  In particular, Robinson thundered that the 
proclamation was “unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States.”1  Like their 
governor, white Kentuckians often opposed federal policy toward slavery because they 
believed it violated of the United States Constitution.  This chapter does not address 
whether President Abraham Lincoln’s actions were constitutional or not.  Scholars have 
devoted countless pages to that important debate.2  Instead, this chapter analyzes and 
assesses the most common legal and constitutional arguments used by Kentuckians to 
criticize emancipation and the enlistment of black soldiers.  First, Kentucky believed that 
the federal Constitution gave neither the President nor the Congress the power to abolish 
slavery.  In addition, Unionists in the state criticized the Lincoln administration for 
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implementing plans that contradicted state constitutions, laws, customs, and traditions.  
Finally, Kentuckians rejected emancipation because of its disregard for the rights of 
private property.  Employing these three arguments as their base, Kentuckians 
constructed a constitutional response to emancipation.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans, North and South, revered the 
federal Constitution and, in most political debates, adopted constitutional rhetoric to 
support their arguments.  During the Civil War, both northern Democrats and 
Republicans cited the Constitution, although they used it for quite different ends.3
Likewise, even when rebelling against the Union, secessionist leaders tied themselves to 
the Constitution, changing only a few passages when creating the founding document of 
the Confederacy.  Respect for the Constitution and debate over its precepts extended 
beyond political leaders.  As historian Harold M. Hyman argued, “Wherever Americans 
gathered, discussion resulted of political issues cast in constitutional terms.”4  Whether 
common Americans were versed in constitutional theory or not, they felt a connection to 
the document and often referenced it when voicing their political opinions.5  The Civil 
War created numerous debates over the powers of Congress and the President under the 
charter.  Could the President suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus?  Could the federal 
government create a new state from part of an existing one?  In Kentucky, the most 
important question was did the federal government have the power to abolish slavery?  
Most Kentuckians answered no.  Even the handful of white Kentuckians who favored 
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emancipation usually believed that slavery was a local or state issue that could not be 
legislated or proclaimed out of existence by officials in Washington. 
The importance Kentuckians placed on the Constitution reflected a widespread
American sentiment.  When they believed the Republican administration was
overstepping its constitutional boundaries, Kentuckians disparaged the President and 
Congress in constitutional terms.  Sometimes Lincoln’s critics in Kentucky simply stated 
that the federal government was “acting against the Constitution.”6  Other times they 
offered more detailed explanations of how the Republicans trampled the Constitution.
Even poorly educated Kentucky soldiers used the Constitution as the basis for their 
political opinions.  Explaining his rationale for not reenlisting in the Union army, 
Corporal Benjamin S. Jones of the 21st Kentucky Infantry wrote, “I dont think that the 
leading men is going according the Constitution and for that reason I did not go in to the 
veterans servis.”7  Regardless of how they voiced their opposition, whether it was a 
simple statement of unconstitutionality or a nuanced dissection of federal behavior, Civil 
War-era Kentuckians demonstrated that they placed great importance on maintaining the 
sanctity of the Constitution as they understood it.
Throughout the war, most Kentuckians held a conservative view of the 
Constitution, similar to that of northern Democrats.  Central to their interpretation was 
that the Constitution applied in war just as it did in peace.8  They did not believe that 
presidential or congressional powers radically expanded or changed as a result of the 
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rebellion.  Though some Kentuckians conceded that presidential power increased
somewhat during war time, most maintained that his authority did not expand to include 
control over property, particularly slavery.  Garrett Davis, one of Kentucky’s United 
States Senators, reflected this conservative interpretation of the Constitution.  Writing 
shortly after the end of the war, Davis laid out his constitutional beliefs, stating, “I 
learned what I know of our political institutions, by reading the constitution in the lights 
held up by Washington, Marshall, Webster and Clay.”  Those early politicians, he argued,
had taught him that “each state expressly reserved its sovereignty – that the people of the 
states made the constitution of the U.S.”  During the war, Davis believed, the federal 
government had snatched all the powers it could, victimizing both the states and the 
people.  Davis specified that property rights, among others, had been trampled by the 
Lincoln administration in its prosecution of the war.9  Davis asked:
Why is it that [$]150,000,000 of slave property has been struck down in Ky? –
that the great mass of that property has been without even the form of a law, taken 
from their owners by lawless power; and if those owners dare attempt to hold 
possession of this property, guarantied by federal & state constitutions & laws, 
they are arrested by negro soldiers, & forced away to military prisons?10
While emancipation was not his only concern, like many white Kentuckians he believed 
that federal policy toward blacks violated both the federal Constitution and the 
constitutions of the states.  From a conservative nineteenth-century perspective, these 
federal actions seriously violated the tenets of the national charter and the traditional 
division of powers and duties between the states and the central government.
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As constitutional historian Phillip S. Paludan argued, Northerners saw attacks on 
slavery as an important part of their effort to preserve the Union and the Constitution.11  
Most white Kentuckians however perceived no connection between the war for the Union 
and the status of their domestic institutions.  As a result, they bristled when Lincoln and 
the Republican leaders in Washington attacked slavery and coupled human bondage with 
the Confederate cause.  Throughout the war, Kentucky Unionists tried numerous means 
and arguments to demonstrate their loyalty while maintaining their human chattel.  
Shortly before Lincoln’s signing of the Emancipation Proclamation, Reverend William T. 
McElroy criticized the policy in his journal but also wrote, “I am still for the Union the 
Constitution & the enforcement of the laws.”12  Union soldier John T. Harrington 
expressed similar sentiment, writing, “I enlisted to fight for the Union and the 
Constitution but Lincoln puts a different construction on things and now has us Union 
men fighting for his Abolition Platform and thus making us a hord [sic] of Subjugators, 
house burners, negro thieves, and devastators of private property.”13  In 1863, while 
describing her uncle’s views of the war, Bevie Cain of Breckinridge County succinctly 
stated the view of many Kentucky Unionists, writing that he “would like nothing better 
than the Union as it was and the Constitution as it is.”14  For Kentuckians, preservation of 
the Union and the Constitution could not be achieved by expanding federal power and 
attacking slavery.
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Lincoln argued that his powers as Commander in Chief of the military gave him 
the authority to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.15  Many Kentuckians, however, 
denied that the President’s powers expanded during times of war.  They particularly 
opposed any expansion of executive authority to deal with slavery and emancipation.
Regarding a proposal for gradual emancipation, Congressman Charles A. Wickliffe 
stated, “I have not, as yet, seen any necessity why we should violate the Constitution in 
order that we should do what is required of us . . . I deny that a state of war increases or 
enlarges the powers of Congress.”16  In a speech before Congress on the Emancipation 
Proclamation, Representative George H. Yeaman asked, “Where did the President derive 
the power to do this great thing?”  The Constitution created the office of the president and 
gave the office its power, Yeaman argued, but “among those [powers] given are none to 
issue such proclamations.”  Moreover, the Congressman stated, “It is very significant,” he 
noted, “that the friends of these measures have not yet claimed that there is any direct 
authority for them, but only that they are . . . useful and necessary war measures.”  
Yeaman, like many of his constituents, believed that the president was “abandoning the 
Constitution” and replacing it with “despotism.”17
Many Kentuckians believed that the Lincoln administration cared little for the 
Constitution. In December 1862, Representative John W. Menzies argued that true 
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“friends of the Constitution” were the opponents of the Emancipation Proclamation.18  
Representative Yeaman offered resolutions in the House, condemning the proclamation 
as “unwarranted by the Constitution” and “dangerous to the rights of citizens and to the 
perpetuity of a free people.”19  In February 1863, Ellen Wallace wrote, “The constitution 
made by our fathers and sealed with their blood is nothing with them compared to the 
Negro.”20  The following year, Bourbon County resident L. G. Ray wrote to 
Congressman Brutus J. Clay, “I perceive you being to feel the tyranical [sic] 
encroachments of the abolitionists, who heed neither law nor Constitution, in the 
accomplishment of their wicked purposes.”21
Kentuckians saw federal – indeed any – interference with slavery as a criminal 
offense.  In January 1863, the Louisville Journal supported Governor James F. 
Robinson’s plan to sign legislation protecting slave property from “the practices of negro-
thieves in the garb of soldiers.”22  While debating the proposed Thirteenth Amendment in 
Congress, Brutus Clay argued that Union troops in Kentucky had used the guise of 
military necessity to take “our slave and other property.”23  Using that same logic, Clay 
noted, troops could justifiably seize “clothing, boots, and shoes” from northern 
manufacturers or rob banks to pay the soldiers.  Because they viewed meddling with 
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slavery as a crime, Kentucky officials sometimes arrested Union officers who harbored 
fugitive slaves.24  
Kentuckians also believed Lincoln had misled them regarding his fidelity to the 
Constitution.  During his first inaugural address on March 4, 1861, Lincoln assured the 
South that he would uphold the Constitution and that he would not interfere with southern 
property.25  However, by the summer of 1862, Kentuckians believed that Lincoln’s 
embrace of emancipation to prosecute the war constituted an unconstitutional course.  In 
Congress, George Yeaman discussed the 1860 platform of the Republican Party and 
Lincoln’s response to John C. Frémont’s 1861 proclamation, pointing out that through the 
first year of the war the Republicans had promised to respect the South’s domestic 
institutions.26  Yet, Lincoln, Yeaman believed, had succumbed to “blind fanaticism” and 
ordered emancipation. This sentiment grew as the war progressed.  Describing the 
sentiments of Christian County residents, Ellen Wallace wrote, “They feel that Lincoln is 
indeed a greater traitor than Jeff Davis because he pretends to support the constitution by 
the very means he takes to destroy it.”27
The enlistment of black troops furthered Kentuckians’ doubts about the 
constitutional powers of the President and Congress. In the July 1862 Senate debate over 
the Militia Act, Garrett Davis condemned the use of black soldiers as unconstitutional.  
Davis argued that they could not be used to fight for a Constitution which “guarantied 
them as property to their owners.”28 Governor Thomas E. Bramlette wrote to Lincoln 
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criticizing the action.  Bramlette argued that the authority to enlist black soldiers came 
from “the sanction of the laws of Nations,” not from the power to call the militia.29  
Consequently, Bramlette believed that the policy was invalid in Kentucky, which was not 
in rebellion.  Moreover, the governor stated, any recruiters operating in the state were 
breaking Kentucky law and could be punished by state authorities. Colonel Frank 
Wolford, who had been arrested and dishonorably discharged from the Union service for 
opposing black enlistment, also used constitutional reasoning to voice his criticism.  
Writing to Lincoln in July 1864, Wolford argued that the use of black soldiers was
unconstitutional and condemned the idea that an action in violation of the Constitution 
could help preserve the Union. “The idea of an unconstitutional policy becoming 
necessary to preserve the government and save the constitution,” he wrote, “is like the 
idea of killing a man to save his life and keep him from dying of disease.”30  
Kentucky also opposed congressional efforts to amend the Constitution.  Like 
many conservative nineteenth-century Americans, Kentuckians believed that the 
Constitution was a static, sacred text and that acceptable amendments clarified rather than 
revised the original document.31  Among the most vocal opponents to altering the 
Constitution were Kentucky’s U. S. Senators, particularly during the early months of 
1864 when Congress debated ratification of the abolition amendment.  On April 8, 
Garrett Davis proclaimed that “the power of amending the Constitution does not 
authorize the abolition of slavery.”  “I deny,” Davis continued, “that the power of 
amendment is illimitable. . . . I deny that the power of amendment carries the power of 
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revolution.”  Davis believed that the power of amendment was only “a power to reform, a 
power to improve,” but that ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment would 
“revolutionize” and “destroy” the government.32  The Republican majority in Congress, 
however, held a different interpretation of the power to amend.  The amendment passed
Congress who sent it to the states for ratification.  
The debate over the Thirteenth Amendment focused on one issue that Americans 
had debated since the founding of the United States: states’ rights.  References to the 
power of the states to control their domestic institutions often appeared in discussions of 
emancipation.  Although conservative constitutional theorist Joel Parker was a New 
Englander, his understanding of the Constitution was similar to that of many 
Kentuckians.33   Describing Parker’s reaction to emancipation, historian Phillip S. 
Paludan wrote, “He knew that war demanded some deviation from established precedent, 
but general emancipation projected not just a deviation from constitutional traditions, but 
a repudiation of them – a true revolution undermining the fundamental principle of the 
entire constitutional experience: local control of local institutions.”34  When the 
government in Washington proposed emancipation, Kentuckians opposed because the 
plan believed it undermined the power of the states, threatening the Constitution and the 
survival of the Union.   
States’ rights ideology was prevalent across the United States in the antebellum 
era.  Historian Harold M. Hyman argued that although the theory was most common in 
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the South, it was “diffused widely if more thinly through the rest of the nation, especially 
in Democratic party councils.”35  Likewise, historian Edward S. Corwin stated that 
secession based on states’ rights was so worrisome to northerners precisely because the 
theory was so widespread across the country.36   By the Civil War, Kentucky had a mixed 
tradition when it came to states’ rights theory.  Although the Kentucky Resolutions of 
1798 and 1799 were part of the foundation of secessionist ideology, Henry Clay, the arch 
nationalist, had been the state’s most famous politician throughout the antebellum period.  
During the war, Kentuckians showed that their attachment to states’ rights had not 
disappeared.37  
Numerous Kentuckians believed the state constitution represented an obstruction 
to federal emancipation policy.  Speaking in Congress in December 1861, Representative 
Aaron Harding proclaimed, “It is manifest that the Constitution of the United States 
secures to each State the right to have or not have the institution of slavery – just as 
essentially so, as it does the right to regulate your own common-school system.”38  “We 
have no more right to make war upon the institution of slavery,” Harding continued,
“than upon any other local institution.”  While debating the Second Confiscation Act in 
the Senate, Garrett Davis declared, “The free States have no more right to force the 
emancipation of slaves upon the slave States than the latter have to enforce slavery upon 
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the North.”39  Not only did Harding, Davis, and others in Congress argue that it was not 
their place to legislate emancipation, but Kentuckians thought that any policy that freed 
blacks violated the Kentucky Constitution. In January 1864, J. R. Bailey wrote to Brutus 
Clay that, “We cannot as a State on account of our Constitution accept compensated
Emancipation.”40  The following month, when a report reached Christian County that 
President Lincoln was preparing to authorize general emancipation, Ellen Wallace 
predicted, “I do not believe he dare do such a thing . . . For it would be trampling state 
law and the constitution underfoot and making himself our master.”41  Kentuckians 
believed that it was outside the power of the federal government to end slavery, and that 
in their state it would require a rewriting of the state constitution.  
Even many of Kentucky’s pro-emancipation Unionists opposed the manner in 
which the North pushed for abolition.  Early in the war, James Speed supported 
compensated emancipation but only if instituted by the states.42  As a Kentucky state 
senator Speed went so far as to propose a bill to confiscate rebel property, including 
slaves, but he was part of the legislative majority that condemned the Emancipation 
Proclamation and argued that black freedom was a state issue.  In April 1864, Kentuckian 
Edward F. Dulin, who believed it in the state’s best interest to “get clear of the negro 
institution,” wrote to state legislator E. Hubbard Smith that emancipation in Kentucky
should be “done by her own people, in her own way, gradually and in her own time.”  
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Emancipation, Dulin continued, should not be instituted “by outsider pressure from 
people of other states, or the power of the Federal Gov.”43    
Promoting a view similar to that of many Kentuckians, Senator Lazarus W. 
Powell often used states’ rights theory to defend Border State slavery.  In the debate over 
emancipation in Missouri, Senator Robert Wilson proposed an amendment that stated the 
bill would go into effect only if approved by the citizens of Missouri.  Speaking in favor 
of the amendment, Powell argued that the Senate should allow Missourians to determine 
“whether or not they will have the institution of slavery abolished in that State.”44 The 
Senate rejected the amendment by an overwhelming majority, and Powell continued to 
oppose the bill.  Finally, Powell asked, “If you can invade the soil of the State of 
Missouri with this kind of unconstitutional legislation, what security has Massachusetts 
that her soil may not be invaded and her dearest constitutional rights stricken down?  
What security has Kentucky?  What security has Indiana and Illinois?  None, sir, none.”45  
Regarding the Thirteenth Amendment, Powell proclaimed, “I want the Union with all the 
institutions that our fathers ordained; and I desire to leave to each State the control of its 
own domestic policy.”46  For Powell and his constituents, the federal assumption of 
power to shape or end state institutions violated the Constitution.
When Kentuckians opposed emancipation using states’ rights arguments, their 
primary concern was retaining the right to private property in humans.  Some 
Kentuckians also voiced concerns about the slippery slope, wandering what other state 
issues would be regulated by the federal government if it began to interfere with slavery.  
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During the debate on the Thirteenth Amendment, Representative Robert Mallory laid out 
a prime example of this argument.  If slavery could be controlled by Washington, 
Mallory asked, could not Congress also pass amendments regulating marriage or “the 
relations between guardian and ward.”47  Such arguments were, however, straw men, and 
the major concern of white Kentuckians was the preservation of slavery.
As unappealing as it is to modern sensibilities, white southerners viewed their 
slaves as property.  While most did not deny that blacks were human, they still 
considered slaves property akin to livestock, real property, or any other possession.  
Holding this opinion, many white Kentuckians believed that emancipation violated the 
right to property guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment of the federal Bill of Rights.  Garrett 
Davis thought “that the government of the U.S. can not acquire an additional power 
whatever, except by an amendment of the constitution [and] that private property can not 
to be taken from the owner except for public and upon making him just compensation.”48  
Davis argued that the President had no power to seize private property and that the 
Constitution guaranteed “every person his property until it is taken from him ‘by due 
course of law.’”49  Lazarus Powell asked, “What kind of morals is that that will take from 
the people of a State against their will their property . . . for the purpose of gratifying the 
fanatical zeal of a party temporarily in power?”50  In the mind of most Kentuckians, any 
proposal to end slavery was an unconstitutional attack on property rights.51  
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As soon as Republicans proposed emancipation, Kentuckians approached the 
issue in terms of property rights.  Representative John J. Crittenden brought up the 
subject during the debate over the First Confiscation Act, arguing that the federal 
government had never held the power to violate property rights and that matters were no 
different in a time of war.52  Pointing out that the Constitution specifically stated that 
forfeiture of property beyond the life of the offender could not be used to punish treason,
Crittenden argued that the bill as written violated the federal charter.53  Crittenden asked, 
“Now I ask my friends everywhere if it is not a plain breach of the Constitution that a 
man shall forfeit his slaves?”54  After showing the disparity between the wording of the 
bill and the provisions of the Constitution, he continued, “In this, however else we may 
differ, there is an apparent unconstitutionality in this bill.”  Crittenden’s arguments, 
however, had little effect in the House, and the bill passed the lower chamber four days 
later.  
As the war progressed, Kentuckians sensed additional threats to their property 
rights.  Shortly before the end of 1861, Aaron Harding predicted that adopting 
emancipation policy would result in Kentucky’s Union soldiers “making war upon the 
institution of slavery – a war for the destruction of their own property.”55  Writing to 
Governor Bramlette after black soldiers seized one of his family’s slaves, S. P. Cope
exclaimed, “My cheek burns with the blush of wounded pride when I remember the 
vehemence with which I used to meet the charge that the authorities of our Government 
would ever render the property of loyal slave owners insecure.”  “I staked my all in the 
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cause of the Union of our Fathers,” Cope continued, “and now I will give all if need be to 
preserve it, but . . . I can claim that my right of property shall be sacred and inviolate.”56  
In January 1864, Brutus Clay wrote to Governor Bramlette requesting him to resist the 
“recruiting of Negroes.”57  Clay stated, “The North is disposed to encroach upon our 
Constitutional rights & intervene in every possible way she can & if we [do not object] 
there is no telling when the encroachment will stop.”  During the debate over the 
Thirteenth Amendment, Clay argued that passing the amendment would “legalize what 
under the laws of the land has hitherto only been robbery.”58  Likewise, Lazarus Powell 
noted of the Thirteenth Amendment, “I do not believe it was ever designed by the 
founders of our Government that the Constitution of the United States should be so 
amended as to destroy property.”59
In order to argue for the protection of slavery, some Kentuckians compared slaves 
to other forms of property.  In the Senate debate on the abolition of slavery in the District 
of Columbia, for example, Garrett Davis inquired of a northern Senator if Congress had 
the right “to take all the lands, and all the houses and lots in this District from their 
owners.”60  Davis was satisfied when the Senator responded that such a seizure would be 
unconstitutional.  On December 18, 1862, George H. Yeaman used the floor of the House 
of Representatives as a forum to criticize Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, 
particularly its violation of property rights.  Yeaman asked, “. . . if he [the President] can 
take my slave, by what system of reason do you convince me he cannot take my horse or 
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my plow, or the land I cultivate with that horse and plow?”61  He then answered his own 
question, “I apprehend the only reason will be found in the fact that there is in this 
country no great political party who hate horses, plows, and land.”  During the debate 
over the Thirteenth Amendment, Lazarus Powell used similar logic.  Powell stated that if 
the federal government could “strike down property in slaves” it could also forbid 
owning horses or land.62
Kentuckians sometimes also used the failure of just compensation to attack 
federal policy.  The place of compensation in plans for emancipation troubled Kentucky’s 
congressional delegation.  In 1862, they rejected Lincoln’s proposal for compensated 
emancipation, but their dismissal was a rebuttal of emancipation in general.  As 
Kentuckians realized that slavery was dying, however, they advocated compensation as a 
condition of emancipation legislation.  During the debate on the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Lazarus Powell suggested additional wording that would require the government to 
compensate masters for their loss of property.63  So unpopular was this proposal that it 
received affirmative votes from only two men: the senators from Kentucky.  In the same 
debate, Garrett Davis warned Charles Sumner, “I think that that Senator and all Senators 
ought to be very guarded in the terms they adopt when they take $500,000,000 of 
property from other people . . . and propose to give them no compensation for it.”64  Even 
after the war, Kentuckians hoped that the government would compensate them for the 
slaves they had freed.  
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While many of the objections Kentuckians made were theoretical in nature, they 
were more worried about interference with their private property in practice.  The actions
of northern soldiers in the state were of particular concern.  In 1862, when Congress 
debated a bill to prevent the military from returning fugitive slaves, Garrett Davis 
proposed a change in wording to make the bill more palatable to Kentuckians worried 
about the antislavery sentiments of northern troops.  Davis proposed that the bill prevent 
the army from returning runaways, but also stop soldiers from “detaining, harboring, or 
concealing any such fugitive.”65  The Senate defeated the proposal despite the fact that
senators from Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri all voted to confirm it.66  In December 
1862, Union infantryman Thomas M. Gunn wrote to his mother, “Many of the officers 
had been complaining and murmuring during the past few days on account of alleged 
interferences in Ky with private property (niggers) on the part of some northern Regts.”67  
Once the United States Colored Troops (USCT) began operating in Kentucky, white
concerns about the preservation of property only increased.  Observing the enlistment of 
black soldiers, Ellen Wallace wrote, “State laws and private property are no stumbling 
blocks to Lincoln’s career of fanatism [sic] and wickedness.”68  In the months after the 
recruiting stations opened in Hopkinsville and other towns, Kentuckians across the state 
complained about the USCT impressing slaves, which in their minds was a violation of 
state law and the property guarantees of the federal Constitution.69
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The importance Kentuckians placed on the Constitution and constitutional norms 
affected their view of Republican Party and Lincoln administration efforts to abolish 
slavery.  Kentuckians believed that in passing emancipation legislation and proclaiming 
the freedom of slaves, Congress and President Lincoln had assumed powers they did not 
possess under the Constitution.  Moreover, Kentucky Unionists condemned the 
Republicans for implementing laws that disregarded the Kentucky state constitution and 
the power of states to control their local affairs in general.  Chief among their concerns 
was the role of the state in defending their private property – that is slaves.  Kentuckians 
used these three arguments to build a constitutional attack on emancipation.
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CHAPTER III
THE RACIAL RESPONSE TO EMANCIPATION
Although constitutional and legal factors propelled Kentucky’s opposition to 
emancipation, white Kentuckians also criticized federal policy in racial terms.  This 
chapter explores how Kentuckians employed racist rhetoric to oppose emancipation and 
the use of African American soldiers.  In general, they employed three arguments against 
emancipation and the enrollment of black troops.  First, they argued that black freedom 
would spark servile insurrection.  Throughout the antebellum period, Kentuckians, like 
most white southerners, worried about the day when slaves might revolt against their 
masters.  Emancipation and the arming of blacks, they believed, could provoke a possible 
uprising. Second, Kentuckians perceived emancipation, and particularly black 
enlistment, as steps toward racial equality.  Most whites believed African Americans to 
be inferior, and thus, federal emancipation policy debased the white population by 
placing it on the same level as blacks.  The third argument Kentuckians used proved the 
most interesting.  Building upon the idea of a paternalistic slave system, many Kentucky 
slaveholders argued that emancipation mistreated once happy slaves by casting them into 
a world where no one would look after them and where they could not take care of 
themselves.
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Most white antebellum Kentuckians believed they were superior to blacks.  Like 
other southerners, Kentuckians held this view for a variety of reasons.1  Slaveholders 
convinced themselves that blacks were barbarous creatures tamed by the confines of 
slavery and civilized by the influence of their masters.  Following the arguments set forth 
by proslavery ideologue William Drayton, southerners believed that slavery tamed 
blacks, but if the restrictions imposed by bondage were removed, they would revert to 
their natural state.  Like Drayton, many whites in the South used the example of Haiti, 
often called San Domingo in the nineteenth century, to prove this point.2  In 1791, slaves 
in San Domingo rose up against their French masters and a bloody civil war ensued.  
Drayton saw the slave revolt as proof of certain inherent black qualities.  Slavery 
repressed these traits, but it could not eradicate them.  Because whites thought blacks to 
be vicious savages in their natural state, Kentuckians, even many who opposed slavery in 
theory, argued that the peculiar institution was necessary to protect the white population. 
They believed that such racial enmity existed that it was impossible for blacks and whites 
to live together in peace.  
In an 1864 speech in the United States Senate, Garrett Davis of Kentucky 
analyzed the inferiority of blacks, presenting some of the most common arguments
Kentuckians made regarding race.  Davis argued that blacks had never been innovative in 
language, mathematics, or arts, and when they did make advancements in those areas it 
was “under the pupilage of the white man and by slow processes.”  Davis used the 
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example of San Domingo to demonstrate that a dominant white population in restraining 
the savagery of blacks.  Davis argued that blacks in San Domingo, once they had 
completed their revolt against the French leaders, began a “degeneration” and “a return 
march . . . to the barbarism of their progenitors.”3  Such beliefs reinforced white support 
for slavery and caused white Kentuckians to fear that when blacks were removed from 
the control of their masters they would take up arms against white southerners.
Rumors of uprisings caused panic throughout the South throughout the nineteenth 
century, and by the Civil War, the South had feared the specter of armed blacks for 
decades.4  Kentuckians were much like other white southerners in this regard.  On no 
fewer than four occasions from 1810 to 1848, panic over insurrection seized white 
Kentuckians.5  In 1810, 1838, and 1848, whites arrested the leaders of the suspected 
rebellions, real or imagined.  A second scare in 1838 fizzled when nothing happened.  In 
1856, fear spread throughout the South that on Christmas Day slaves across the region 
would rise up and murder their masters.  As part of the plot, slaves at the ironworks on 
the Kentucky-Tennessee border near Hopkinsville would fight their way from 
southwestern Kentucky to Indiana.  As the stories spread across the state, new plot 
rumors appeared, spurring greater suspicion.  Wishing that she had “half a dozen
revolvers” to protect herself, Ellen Wallace, a slaveholder from Hopkinsville, was caught 
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up in the panic.6  From November 20, when she first mentioned it, to the middle of 
December, Wallace was obsessed with the rumors of violence.  In Hopkinsville,
townspeople horded ammunition and armaments, and they arrested as many as fifty 
blacks thought to be involved in the plot.7  One hundred and fifty Christian County men 
also formed a patrol to guard against the impending insurrection.8  Although no uprising 
occurred, Wallace recorded no fewer than nine hangings of black suspects.9  In the years 
preceding the Civil War, incidents such as John Brown’s 1859 raid on Harper’s Ferry 
reawakened fears of slave revolt.10  
Because of the paranoia that resulted from rumors of servile insurrection, 
Kentuckians reacted harshly to antislavery whites who supported, or even hinted at the 
possibility of, slave revolt.  In Lexington in 1845, Kentucky emancipationist Cassius M. 
Clay began publishing his antislavery newspaper, the True American.  For two months, 
Clay met with little more than verbal criticism.  Then, on August 12, Clay ran an editorial 
that suggested slave revolt was the imminent result of human bondage.  Within a week, a 
mob closed down his newspaper and shipped his printing equipment north of the Ohio 
River.11  The treatment Clay received was tame compared to Kentuckians’ response to 
later such statements.  In November 1859, while visiting Massachusetts, Kentucky 
abolitionist John G. Fee argued that abolitionists needed more men with the spirit of John 
Brown.  Although that sentiment was offensive enough to most white Kentuckians, 
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newspapers in the state distorted his statements and created widespread outrage.  In 
December, when Fee returned to his antislavery community at Berea, sixty men 
representing a larger group of opponents gave the Bereans ten days to leave the state or 
be killed.  Thirty Bereans left following those threats, and by the following summer, over 
one hundred of Fee’s followers had been driven from the state.12
While many Kentuckians feared the specter of race war, Ellen Wallace was 
particularly affected by the threats of black-on-white violence.  Ironically, although most 
slaveholders feared revolt, they trusted their own slaves.  As historian Bertram Wyatt-
Brown noted, southerners left their “doors unlatched, windows open, gates ajar.  Slaves 
roamed in an out of the ‘Big House’ day and night . . ..”13  As historian Patricia Hoskins 
Simpson has shown, however, Wallace was afraid of her slaves.  Simpson argued that 
after 1856, Wallace never trusted her slaves again, and she worried constantly about slave 
revolt.14  In April 1861, as the war began, Wallace described the national situation as a 
storm, but added, “There is yet one deeper shade to be added to the scene, that is servile 
insurrection.”15  In late 1862, she believed revolt “will be the consequence [of 
emancipation] unless the strong arm of the nation prevents it.”16  As the war progressed, 
black freedom and the recruitment of African American soldiers compounded her fears.
Wallace was not alone in her concerns.  In September 1861, in the aftermath of 
Frémont’s Missouri proclamation, Joshua F. Speed wrote to Lincoln expressing his fear 
of slave revolt.  Speed informed the president, “All of us who live in slave states whether 
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Union or loyal have great fear of insurrection.”17 In December 1862, Representative 
George H. Yeaman responded to Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation by warning of 
slave violence.  Emancipation would, Yeaman argued, “result in a war of races.”18  In 
February 1863, when Massachusetts recruited black contraband to help fill their 
enlistment quota, Senator Garrett Davis declared, “The negroes are reclaimed savages, 
and you want to put them in a position where they will relapse into savageism again.”19  
Like many southerners, Davis turned to San Domingo as an example of the results of 
emancipation.  Davis asked his Senate colleagues, “How long were the negroes of San 
Domingo under the humanizing influence of the French; and yet . . . how soon did they 
degenerate into barbarism and into the most bloody and diabolical devils?”20  As the war 
progressed and the Union enlisted black soldiers, white fears of a race war increased.    
Building upon antebellum fears of slaves revolts, numerous reports of 
depredations and atrocities committed by USCT units in the state reinforced white 
concerns that armed blacks would retaliate against their former masters.  Some of the
more dramatic incidents involve violence perpetrated by black soldiers upon white 
civilians.  In July 1864, Ellen Wallace wrote that her brother-in-law Arthur had been 
accosted by a “Negro Regiment.”21  According to Ellen, the black soldiers committed “all
manner of outrages, shaking their fist in his face and threatening to shoot him through if 
he opened his mouth.”  After plundering his house, the USCT regiment then impressed 
Wallace’s male slaves and threatened to burn his home.  Less than three months after 
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Arthur Wallace’s reported run-in with the USCT, a company of African American 
soldiers moved into Hopkinsville.  The town’s white population was horrified.  
Describing the USCT encampment as a “long dreaded event,” Ellen Wallace worried that 
she would have to remove her children from school “owing to the town being filled with 
Negro soldiers.”22  She continued, “It will be unsafe for a decent woman to walk the 
street.”  In January 1864, Wallace stated that her “chief fear” was the USCT units 
stationed along the Kentucky-Tennessee border: “Should they become insubordinate or 
beheaded by desperate Abolitionist and over-run the country, our condition would be 
fearful.”23  When USCT soldiers became a common sight in Hopkinsville, Wallace 
believed that “white women . . . will find it necessary to carry daggers and revolvers in 
their girdles in place of pin cushions and scissors.”24
Across the state, Kentuckians feared the possibility of servile insurrection.  In 
Lexington, Frances Peter feared that “before the war is over it is not improbable that we 
may have to fight them [black soldiers] as well as the secesh.”25  In 1865, an anonymous 
USCT officer from Kentucky admitted that he had been responsible for “permitting, 
allowing, & giving permission to my men to fire indiscriminately through the Town 
[probably Henderson].”26  Even after the war, Kentuckians complained about the USCT.  
W. M. Spencer wrote to Governor Thomas E. Bramlette in September 1865 informing 
him of violence committed by black soldiers in Lebanon, Kentucky.  According to 
Spencer, “thirty or forty negroe [sic] soldiers . . . using the most vociferous & profane 
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language” threatened a discharged Union soldier and chased him through the streets of 
Lebanon.  Spencer added that other white men had been beaten and threatened and white 
women insulted.27  While it may never be known how accurate these descriptions were, 
white Kentuckians believed them and perceived a world turned upside down, a world in 
which whites were now subservient to blacks.
Another concern was the protection of personal property, particularly slaves.  
Bondsmen who fled to the Union armies often took their owner’s wagons and horses.28  
Numerous reports depict black soldiers stealing any number of items from civilians.  In 
February 1864, A. Bradshaw of Paducah wrote to Governor Bramlette, complaining of 
groups of “these semi-baboons driving a gov. waggon [sic] up to some house either in the 
city or country and in the most insolent manner proceed to pack up whatever they may 
choose to claim as theirs and return in triumph to the redervous [sic] of the nations 
defenders.”29 More troubling to white Kentuckians, the USCT was proactive in freeing 
slaves.  Numerous reports from across the state corroborate that black soldiers impressed 
slaves.  In February 1864, J. H. Mackenzie, a Union officer stationed in Paducah, 
complained of “armed negroes” being “permitted to go with impunity into the Dwellings 
of True and Loyal Men, use insolent language to the family and take by force the only 
servant of the family.”30  In June 1864, the 120th United States Colored Infantry traveled 
through Henderson County “seizing negroes and carrying them off without their own 
consent.”31  Ellen Wallace commented on impressments, including incidents in 
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September 1864, when “Negro armed soldiers going in gangs of forty” were “forcing” 
Hopkinsville slaves to join them.32  In March 1865, E. H. Green of Henderson wrote to 
Secretary of War Edwin E. Stanton, complaining that his slaves had been “forced into the 
Service at the point of the bayonet & against their free will & consent.”33  Two of the 
men in question filed affidavits stating that they had been threatened with jail time if they 
did not enlist.34 Green argued that had the slaves been inducted legally, he would not 
have protested, as he had not when three others had enlisted.
As in the North, many Kentuckians doubted the ability of African Americans to 
become effective soldiers.  When the Lincoln administration announced black enlistment, 
Louisville Journal editor George D. Prentice mocked the idea of “General Cuffee” and 
“Rear Admiral Sambo.”35  In June 1864, even after black units fought well at Milliken’s 
Bend in Louisiana and Battery Wagner in South Carolina, Louisvillian Arthur Peter 
wrote to his brother, Dr. Robert Peter of Lexington, arguing “the nigger [is] not worth the 
labor & cost now being expended . . ..  Nothing but desertion will follow their use as 
soldiers.”36  Robert Peter’s daughter, Frances, wrote in her diary that “the negro he is 
much too averse to work, too timid to make a good soldier,” and “this arming & equiping 
of negro regiments is a mere waste of time and money.”37  Even a Kentuckian who 
commanded a black regiment complained of how difficult it was “to take charge of 
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illiterate, ignorant revengeful, blood-thirty negroes, & bring them down in the space of 2 
or 3 months to regular disciplined soldiers.”38  The service of the USCT convinced many 
northerners that they had been mistaken to criticize the use of black soldiers.39  However, 
the performance of the USCT did not curb most Kentucky’s opposition to black troops.  
Indeed, the state’s residents often found evidence to support their prejudices in the reports 
of battles where blacks fought well.  In response to Milliken’s Bend, for example, John 
Henry Hammond, a Kentucky soldier in General William T. Sherman’s army, wrote, “I 
feel almost frightened at the consequences of this fight. . . . I fear a San Domingo.”40
While Kentuckians feared violent reprisals from freedmen, they had other 
concerns as well.  Emancipation and the enlistment of African American soldiers raised 
the question of racial equality.  Whites feared that black freedom and army service 
constituted a smokescreen by abolitionists to either raise African Americans to the level 
of whites or degrade southern whites to the status of blacks.  Most Kentuckians opposed a 
racially egalitarian society.  In 1864, Garrett Davis, arguing against the repeal of the 
Fugitive Slave Laws of 1791 and 1850, stated, “Sir, I claim a proud superiority to the 
African race.”  “I am,” he continued, “a Caucasian by descent, I am a Celt by extraction, 
and . . . I am of a superior race to them, and I intend to assert and maintain that 
superiority as long as I have the power.”  Yet, in his mind, northern abolitionists wanted 
to help blacks undermine white supremacy: “It is an immutable law of all inferior races . . 
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. to desire to pull down the superior race to their own inferiority; and the operation of this 
law in our country is one cause of the irrational clamor for negro equality.”41  The 
superiority white Kentuckians felt contributed to their reaction against emancipation.
 The use of black soldiers brought the issue of racial equality to the forefront.  In 
August 1862, the Kentucky legislature passed a resolution that proclaimed, “The free-
born white men of this country . . . will feel themselves disparaged and insulted by such 
an association, and to impose it upon them will drive more strength and courage from the 
Federal ranks than can be supplied by any possible levy of negroes.”42  D. C. Wickliffe, 
editor of the Lexington Observer & Reporter, believed that black enlistment brought 
“negro equality . . . upon the country more speedily than was hoped for even by the most 
radical Abolitionist.”43  In a September 1864 letter to President Lincoln, Governor
Bramlette also discussed the importance of “preserving the rights and liberties of our own 
race,” arguing that Kentuckians would not “sacrifice a single life, or imperil the smallest 
right of free white men for the sake of the negro.”44  
Kentucky politicians in Washington numbered among some of the most vocal 
opponents of racial equality.  In the House of Representatives, Robert Mallory discussed 
the use of black soldiers, lamenting that they were stationed “behind fortifications and out 
of the reach of the guns of the enemy.”  Moreover, Mallory stated, “You have made them 
equal to white soldiers in pay, clothing, rations, and position; you make them superior to 
white soldiers by saving them from danger and wounds an death.”  Mallory concluded, 
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“You make the white private soldier to a level with or below the negro.”45
Representative Aaron Harding likewise complained that racial equality resulted from
black enlistment, yet he was also bothered by what he perceived to be northern hypocrisy 
on the issue.  Referring to the congressional delegation from Massachusetts, Harding 
stated:
You want to force the white soldiers to an equality with the negroes, force them to 
associate and to mess with them, and force them to fight with them.  How would 
you like it yourselves, as much as you love the negro?  Are you willing to take 
them into your embraces and make them your associates in this House?  Would 
you be willing to sit by them here and vote with them?  Of course you would not.  
And yet you want to force the whites soldier in the Army into an equality with 
him.46
Kentuckians dreaded the thought of racial equality, but they believed that their 
opponents, the northern abolitionists pushing for emancipation and black enlistment, also 
opposed social equality.
While newspaper men and politicians filled the national debate with racial
imagery, common Kentuckians echoed their sentiments.  Civilians like Ellen Wallace 
believed that under slavery blacks had understood their proper place in society.  With 
emancipation, however, she saw docile servants become independent persons, whose 
wishes did not coincide with those of their former masters.47  As early as February 1863, 
Wallace believed that the Lincoln administration could “think of nothing but the Negro.”  
“The interest of the white man,” she argued, “is nothing in comparison to that of the 
Negro.”48  For Wallace, the most egregious example of the Union supporting blacks over 
whites was the decision to arm them.  By December 1863, according to Wallace, Lincoln 
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had made whites subservient to armed blacks.49  Wallace saw the enlistment of African 
Americans as an affront to white supremacy because the army forced white soldiers to 
march “side by side and shoulder to shoulder with Negro troops.”50  Enlisted men, such 
as Sergeant Hardy U. Jaggers, complained, “I dont like to be Eaquelized with a big Buck 
Nigger.”51  Recording their thoughts in journals and letters to family members, these 
Kentuckians demonstrated that racial prejudice was more than a mere political tool; it 
was a reality for most whites.    
Such individuals believed that emancipation and the use of black soldiers 
undermined white supremacy and what they perceived as the natural social order.  Whites 
saw African Americans who seized their freedom as insolent and impudent.   By the 
summer of 1864, Ellen Wallace had grown tired of dealing with African Americans who 
were in her mind “the only priviledged class” in Kentucky.  Wallace believed that 
masters were required to tolerate “high handed impudence in whatever form they may 
chose [sic] to show it.”52  During the war, blacks could choose whether to obey their 
owners or not.  While the laws of Kentucky still bound them as chattel, the Union army
offered freedom, and slaves could decide to leave a demanding or abusive master for 
federal lines. 
Most white Kentuckians believed that it was impossible for African Americans to 
attain any level of prosperity without white supervision, and many opposed emancipation 
because they thought blacks were unable to care for themselves.  Moreover, they did not 
believe northern abolitionists would provide the support necessary for blacks to survive.  
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Never abandoning antebellum defenses of slavery, Kentucky slaveholders argued that
they were concerned for the wellbeing of blacks.
Historian Joel Williamson has described paternalism as a mechanism for white 
southerners to improve their own self-image.53  By imagining blacks to be subordinate, 
child-like heathens, whites legitimized their role as masters and also saw themselves as a 
kind and Christianizing influence.  In June 1864, Representative Robert Mallory 
proclaimed, “[T]he condition of slavery existing in my State and the other slave States is 
the best condition in which the African has ever been placed on the continent of 
America.”54  Describing the views of her uncle, Bevie Cain of Breckinridge County 
emphasized the idea that “the poor Africans . . . are best off with some one to look after 
them.”55  This self-perception convinced southerners that their slaves were happier than 
northern free laborers.  In January 1863, Louisville Journal editor George D. Prentice 
wrote, “The slaves as a body would not leave their masters if they could and could not if 
they would.”56  Prentice believed that many blacks would remain enslaved because of 
their “attachment” to their owners. In January 1864, Ellen Wallace wrote that before the 
war “the negroes were cheerful and contented, adored their master and worked well.”57  
Even into the summer of 1864, she thought that her slaves were loyal to her and that they 
only left because abolitionist officers pressured them.58
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When Kentuckians argued that emancipation policy led to racial equality, they 
often pointed out that the northerners pushing for such measures were not any more 
willing to treat blacks as equals than southerners.  Likewise, many Kentuckians 
proclaimed to care more for the well-being of African Americans than the northern 
abolitionists.  In Congress in 1861, Aaron Harding stated, “[T]he abolitionist is the worst 
enemy of the slaves, and the humane master his truest and best friend.”59  In March 1864, 
Edward H. Taylor of Frankfort wrote to Lincoln discouraging the president from 
continuing his emancipation policy, noting, “I am a Slave holder individually care 
nothing except for their own sakes.”  Recalling that he had kept his son’s slaves from 
being separated to pay debts, Taylor concluded, “Now who cared more for the Negro the 
abolitionist or myself.”60  After the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, John W. Jones 
of Bourbon County predicted that the abolitionists would betray the freedmen, who 
would soon “look back to the old fires of the master with tears & mourn the disposition 
of by gone days.”61  Kentucky slaveholders saw themselves as providers for a class of 
people who needed care that the abolitionists were unwilling to give.  For that reason, 
they condemned northerners for wanting to end slavery while giving no thought to the 
condition of those freed.
Their paternalistic view of slavery led Kentuckians to warn northerners of the 
negative repercussions emancipation for freedmen.  In December 1862, Representative 
George H. Yeaman predicted that colonization outside of the United States was 
impractical and that blacks would find life difficult in the country as well.  Yeaman stated 
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that northerners would mistreat freedmen, if they were allowed in the North at all; yet, he 
saw little hope of southern whites living with their former property.  Yeaman could not 
envision anything but hardship as a result of emancipation.62  In January 1863, Hamilton 
Gray of Maysville wrote to Lincoln complaining that emancipation will have a negative 
effect on southern blacks.  Gray feared that freedmen would flock north and “become a 
pest to Society.”  Gray expressed concerns that the federal government would be unable 
and northerners would be unwilling to care for the refugees.  He implied that white 
Kentuckians would take better care of blacks as slaves than as free persons.63  Robert 
Mallory was more explicit.  In a speech before Congress, Mallory stated, “By destroying 
all interest of the master in the preservation of the health of the slave, you diminish his 
care and kindness and indulgence to him.”64  For most white Kentuckians, slavery offered 
the best situation for both whites and blacks.
In voicing their concerns about post-emancipation conditions, Kentuckians at 
least implied, if they did not explicitly assert, that blacks were incapable of caring for 
themselves. For example, Mallory argued that after emancipation, “The watchful care of
the intelligent and interested master over the young is lost, and they are left to grow up 
uncared for except by the negro father and mother, whose ignorance and indifference to 
the welfare of their offspring are matters of common notoriety.”65  In June 1864, offering 
a typical analysis of black abilities, Garrett Davis feared that the emancipation of 
southern slaves would replicate the scene in San Domingo.  He argued that blacks in San 
Domingo believed they were prepared to rule themselves, because they were under the 
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tutelage of whites.  However, Davis contended, “They soon manifested their 
incompetence to the great duty, and . . . decaying prosperity and civilization proved how 
much better the condition of the island was when it was a slave possession of France.”66  
Many white Kentuckians believed that if the freedman’s descent back into “barbarism” 
did not result in violence, it would prevent blacks from being anything but a drain on 
white society.
The paternalism of white Kentuckians became most clear in their descriptions of 
former slaves in Union camps.  Ellen Wallace believed that before the war “confidence 
and trust” had existed between the master and slave.67  The relationship, however, was 
destroyed by the Union presence in Kentucky and Tennessee.  Wallace argued that the 
Union army coerced slaves into joining them and leave behind their caring masters.  In 
November 1863, she wrote, “The poor Negro is the innocent victim of this war. They are 
decoyed from their homes . . . and then left to starve and die without shelter or any 
earthly comfort.”68  In June 1864, Representative Henry Grider commented on the status 
of blacks who had been freed by the government, noting that before Kentucky accepted 
emancipation the state’s “slaves must be . . . cared for better than they are now, have food 
and raiment, and such advancement as they need and are competent to receive.”69
Wallace and Grider, like many white Kentuckians, believed slaveowners were the proper 
caregivers for blacks.  When freedmen suffered in contraband camps, it convinced them
that emancipation was the wrong course.  
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Some Union military commanders did in fact refuse to provide for refugees.  One 
of the more well known cases of federal negligence occurred at Camp Nelson, located in 
Madison County.  By mid-1864, Camp Nelson was Kentucky’s largest black recruiting 
station.70  The camp also attracted hundreds of women and children related to the soldiers 
who enlisted there.  Legally, these blacks were not contraband or freedmen; they were 
runaways.  Yet, many found themselves caught between the army, which could not 
accept them, and their masters, who often refused to care for them once their husbands 
and fathers joined the military.71  In July 1864, Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas 
forbade camps to admit any additional dependants of USCT soldiers.72  At Camp Nelson, 
slaveholders who were aware of the order traveled to the camp to reclaim their property.  
The War Department, however, forced Thomas to rescind his order and directed him
neither to encourage nor dissuade refugees from entering the camps.  This change in 
policy, however, failed to prevent one of the most egregious examples of federal
mistreatment of soldiers’ families.  In late November 1864, General Speed S. Fry, 
commander of Camp Nelson, expelled approximately four hundred women and children.
Although the order was not the first of its kind, no previous expulsion had taken place in 
severe weather conditions.  In rain and temperatures below freezing, many black 
dependants died from exposure as well as from starvation.  Numerous stories tell of cold, 
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hungry refugees along the road leading away from Camp Nelson.73  Conditions became
so awful that one woman reportedly attempted to sell her baby for food.74  In June 1865, 
Captain Theron E. Hall, a quartermaster officer at Camp Nelson, wrote of the expulsion, 
“Many died; and many contracted diseases from which, but few ever entirely 
recovered.”75  Public outcry over the eviction forced officials to provide better care for 
the families of enlisted men, but it was too late to convince Kentuckians that the Union 
army would care for their former slaves. 
Conditions in refugee camps were often dire even when those in charge had the 
best of intentions.  The Union military did not have the infrastructure to care for the 
influx of thousands of freedpeople, and as a result, they endured hunger, unsanitary living 
conditions, and inadequate housing.76  Refugees suffered at Louisa, Louisville, 
Munfordville, Owensboro, and other Kentucky towns.  At Paducah, Colonel W. H. Barry 
refused to return to slavery the women and children at Fort Anderson, but he also lacked 
the means to provide for them.77  In July 1865, three Union officers stationed in Bowling 
Green, Kentucky, reported that although some freedmen were doing well the “larger 
portion” were destitute, “having no means of subsistence . . ., living in the building
known as ‘the old school house,’ or in sheds, or deserted buildings . . ., without beds or 
bedding, or any utensils for cooking.”78  Even after public outrage led to improved
treatment of the refugees at Camp Nelson, the humanitarians who took charge of the 
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contraband camp could not alleviate all of its problems.  In shelter similar to army 
barracks, women and children suffered from inadequate clothing, food, and medical care, 
and between April and July 1865, over one hundred women and four hundred children 
died at Camp Nelson.79  Through the last two years of the war, Kentucky blacks found 
themselves caught between slavery and freedom, between masters who would not and a 
military that could not care for them.  Not recognizing their own role in the suffering, 
many Kentuckians used the circumstances of black refugees to condemn the actions of 
the Lincoln administration.
White Kentuckians feared that emancipation and black enlistment threatened 
southern society.  Whites opposed the disintegration of slavery because it endangered 
white supremacy.  Kentuckians became concerned that emancipation and especially the 
arming of freedmen encouraged African Americans to use violence against them.  
Building upon antebellum paranoia of slave revolts, whites believed that the removal of 
restrictions on blacks would result in uprisings.  If the former slaves did not attack whites 
with guns and swords, Kentuckians believed that with the help of northern abolitionists 
blacks would undermine the status quo and achieve racial equality.  Yet, Kentuckians 
also thought that blacks needed white supervision to avoid returning to savagery.  Using 
paternalistic arguments that followed the same logic as antebellum defenses of slavery, 
many white Kentuckians considered blacks incapable of succeeding on their own.  These 
three aspects made up Kentucky’s racially based attack on emancipation and the use of 
African American troops.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ECONOMIC RESPONSE TO EMANCIPATION
While Kentuckians used constitutional and racial arguments to oppose  
emancipation, they began to discuss the economic ramifications of emancipation soon 
after black freedom became a reality.  In the last years of the war, emancipation was a 
major blow to the southern economy.  Southerners were renowned for being land and 
slave rich and money poor.  With emancipation, Kentuckians lost millions of dollars in 
investment capital.  Moreover, their farms and plantations also lost value as their ability 
to produce crops declined.  Agricultural production dropped across the South, and 
Kentucky did not escape the general downturn.  Tobacco production dropped by more 
than half in the state, the wheat crop decreased by almost two-thirds, and the hemp yield 
plummeted 80 percent.1  While the military presence in the state hampered agricultural 
production, the loss of a large portion of the workforce proved more significant.2  
Summing up Kentucky’s situation, nineteen Kentucky slaveholders requested, on behalf 
of their counties, “the return of their Negroes . . . at least long enough to enable them to 
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prepare their crops for market, which they cannot do without them.”3  This chapter 
analyzes the ways in which the state’s declining economy shaped Kentuckians’ views of 
emancipation.  
Slavery in Kentucky was different than the institution in most of the South.  
Slavery shaped the Border South’s economy and culture.4  Unlike in the Deep South 
where agriculture depended on large quantities of laborers who grew cotton, sugar, and 
rice, the Border States’ agricultural staples, increasingly grains, did not require extensive 
year-round labor like those produced in the Deep South.5  Although some areas of the 
state, particularly the Jackson Purchase and the counties surrounding Lexington, bore 
more resemblance to the staple economies of the Lower South, the average slaveholder in 
the state owned five slaves and almost one-fourth only owned one.6  By 1860, despite the 
scarcity of traditional plantations in Kentucky, more slaveholders lived in Kentucky than 
in any state other than Virginia or Georgia.7  As a result, most white Kentuckian were
connected in some way to the institution, although their ties usually came from owning 
one or two slaves rather than fifteen or twenty.  Even more Kentuckians came to rely on 
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slave labor as a result of the practice known as “hiring out.”8  Slaves could be rented to 
accomplish specific tasks, to work during a particular agricultural season like planting or 
harvesting, or for an entire year.  The flexibility of the system enabled Kentuckians who 
were either unable or unwilling to purchase slaves to benefit from their labor.  Between 
slave ownership and slave hiring, a majority of Kentucky’s population relied on bonded 
labor.  
Emancipation’s effect on the economy seems not to have entered the debate over 
black liberation until near the end of 1862.  An increase in the number of runaway slaves 
served as the catalyst for Kentuckians to complain about the economic impact of black 
freedom.  When Abraham Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation, Kentucky’s 
slaves gained confidence that they would not be turned away from Union camps.  
Although Kentucky blacks began fleeing their masters for Federal camps in 1861, 
Lincoln’s proclamation standardized Union treatment of runaways.  Slaves in the 
southwestern part of the Kentucky were especially susceptible to flight.  Many slaves in 
the counties along the Kentucky-Tennessee border found refuge at recruiting stations a 
few miles across the state line.  Ellen Wallace often complained about Christian County 
slaves who ran away, often in groups as large as sixty, to Fort Donelson, where they were 
protected by the “abolitionist,” Colonel Abner C. Harding of the 83rd Illinois Infantry.9  
Harding, who took control of Fort Donelson in early 1863, refused to return runaways to 
their masters.  By March, the refugee camp at Donelson housed approximately three 
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hundred freedmen, and that number only increased.10  By November 1863, the Union fort 
also operated as a recruiting center for African American soldiers.  Also, slaves began to 
flee more frequently and in family groups, especially after March 1865 when Congress 
freed the families of soldiers.  Because of its proximity to the state line, Fort Donelson 
was a convenient destination for slaves in southwestern Kentucky.  By 1864, the presence 
of the Union military in Clarksville and at Fort Donelson encouraged almost nightly 
“stampedes” of runaway slaves.11  
As the number of fugitives grew, Kentuckians began to complain to military and 
government officials.  In December 1863, Benjamin H. Bristow wrote, with the 
endorsement of U. S. Representative George H. Yeaman and Unconditional Unionist 
politician C. F. Burnam, to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton presenting the case of 
those living in southern Kentucky.12  Bristow stated that the civilians in that area wished 
the recruiting stations along the border to be moved farther south and hoped that the 
camps could be made to refuse Kentucky blacks.  The following month, Bristow wrote to 
Governor Thomas E. Bramlette that the citizens of Christian County had pleaded with 
him to help them maintain their slave property.  According to Bristow, local civilians 
believed the Union army in Tennessee met runaway slaves at the border and “escorted 
[them] to the recruiting camp at Clarksville.”13  The flight of slaves from Christian 
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County to Tennessee became so pervasive that slaveowners in the county petitioned both
President Lincoln and Bramlette to help curb the runaways.  Nineteen Hopkinsville-area 
slaveowners wrote Lincoln asking for “the relief of our suffering, but still Loyal people, 
by ordering the return of their Negroes.”14  Specifically, the petition complained about 
the recruiting office in Clarksville, Tennessee, only about twenty-five miles from 
Hopkinsville and less than ten miles from the Christian County line.  Slaves in and 
around Hopkinsville fled to Clarksville, and the petitioners reported that no owners had 
been able to retrieve their chattel regardless of loyalty.  
Around the same time, twenty-four Christian County residents petitioned to 
Bramlette pleading that he help stop the runaways.15  The signers stressed that, “Some of 
our largest farmers & best Citizens (loyal men) are losing all [their slaves] except the 
helpless ones.”  Feeling that the government should assist loyal Kentuckians in retaining 
their slave property, the petitioners asked Bramlette for help, writing, “We feel that 
loyalty & protection should be inseperable [sic], and & hope his [Bramlette’s] authority 
will be used for our relief.”  Benjamin H. Bristow corroborated their claims, writing,
“Utter ruin is impending indeed I may say is already upon them.”16  An August 1864 
petition from seven “loyal Citizens of Todd County” to Adjutant General Lorenzo 
Thomas reported similar circumstances.17  The petitioners stated that in the twelve 
months prior “several hundred slaves” had fled to Clarksville.    
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White Kentuckians were concerned that the example of runaways would interfere 
with their ability to control their remaining slaves.  In November 1862, when a “large 
Federal force” entered Hopkinsville, Ellen Wallace complained, “There was quite a large 
number of negroes following the army.  I fear the effect on the slaves will be injurious.”18  
The following day Wallace described the 3rd Kentucky Cavalry entering town.  Among 
the Union cavalrymen was a group of “contraband negroes in a body with a banner.”19  
Moreover, two of them were armed.  Wallace wrote that the sight was “very offensive to 
all loyal citizens, however enthusiastick.”  She continued, “We cannot guess what the 
result of this thing will be, but we anticipate great trouble in the management of our 
servants to say the least.”  Within two days, Wallace’s fears were confirmed: “The slaves 
in large number are constantly making their escape to different divisions of the Federal 
army.”20  The issue of black flight persisted and even expanded throughout the rest of the 
war.
While the presence of Union soldiers encouraged slaves to seek freedom within 
federal lines from the war’s outset, slaveholders found black flight a greater problem
when United States Colored Troops (USCT) units were stationed in the state. Indeed, 
Union officials used troops, black and white, to encourage Kentucky’s black men to 
enlist in the army.  Writing from Louisville, Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas wrote to 
Secretary of War Stanton, “[R]ecruiting, to be fully successful, must be done with strong 
armed parties passing through the counties containing the most negroes.”  “The negroes,” 
he continued, “seeing that protection will be offered them, will rapidly join the troops.”21  
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Thomas was correct.  From the summer of 1864 until the end of the war, over 23,000 
black Kentuckians enlisted in the military.22  Describing the extensive effect of black 
recruitment, James S. Brisbin wrote, “Negro enlistments have bankrupted slavery here, 
over 22,000 of the most valuable slaves having already gone into serve while the few 
thousands left are being rapidly gathered up by recruiting officers and put into the 
army.”23  The enlistments extended beyond men suitable for military service, as Brisbin 
noted, “Even old men and boys are found to be fit for duty in Invalid Regiments and are 
taken.  From ten to a hundred enlist daily, freeing . . . an average of five women and 
children per man, thus from 300 to 500 black people are daily made free through the 
instrumentality of the army.”  As numerous historians have argued, black enlistment, for 
all practical purposes, ended slavery in Kentucky.24
Emancipation hurt Kentucky’s economy in a variety of ways, beginning with the 
loss of capital investment.  When developing his plan for compensated emancipation in 
Delaware, Lincoln proposed paying $400 per slave.25  At that price, Kentuckians stood to 
lose over $90 million if their slaves ran away or were freed without compensation, and 
Lincoln’s offering was not even close to prevailing market values before the war.26  
Although, by mid-1862, prices for slaves had plunged from a pre-war value of $500 to 
$1200 per slave to $200 to $400, Kentuckians could not justify accepting what they 
                                               
22 Marion B. Lucas, “Camp Nelson, Kentucky, During the Civil War: Cradle of Liberty or Refugee Death 
Camp?” Filson Club History Quarterly 63 (October 1989): 441.  
23 James S. Brisbin to Thomas E. Bramlette, 14 April 1865, Bramlette Papers-KDLA.
24 Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky, 247; Lucas, A History of Blacks in Kentucky, 152-
59.
25 Basler, ed., Collected Works, vol. 5, 160.
26 This amount is calculated on Kentuckians owning 225,483 slaves; Kenneth H. Williams and James 
Russell Harris, eds., “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical Overview,” Register of the Kentucky Historical 
Society 103 (Autumn 2005): 751.  On prices of slaves, see Table A.3.3 in Roger L. Ransom, Conflict and 
Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, Emancipation, and the American Civil War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 75.
83
believed to be an unfair price for their human property.27  The effect of emancipation on 
individual slaveholders cannot be underestimated.  Over the course of the war, the value 
of slave property in Kentucky declined from $107,494,527 in 1860 to $7,224,851 five 
years later.28  As early as March 1862, the economic impact of emancipation worried 
Kentuckians like William C. Bullitt who predicted that emancipation would “take off 
four-fifths of my Estate.”29  While few Kentuckians owned as large a number of slaves as 
Bullitt and his family, many had some investment in slave property.  Kentucky’s 
congressional delegation also recognized the impact emancipation would have on the 
slaveholders and argued against black liberation on economic terms.  While debating the 
conscription of black soldiers, Representative Brutus J. Clay informed his colleagues that 
in 1860 Kentuckians had invested $107 million, more than a fifth of the state’s whole 
property value, in slaves.30  
In addition to the loss of capital due to runaways, doubt regarding the longevity of 
the institution hurt the value of slave property in Kentucky.  By mid-1863, the impending 
demise of slavery caused an insecurity that lowered the value of land and enslaved labor.  
In late 1863, after months of watching numerous slaves flee from their owners in 
Hopkinsville, Ellen Wallace confessed, “I have no idea that we can hold our Negroes.”31
In October, she commented that “Negro property in Kentucky” was losing its value, and 
by December, she noted that a drop in land prices was the result of “the great uncertainty 
of slave labour.”32  The following January, U. S. Representative Aaron Harding warned 
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his son of the “strong probability that all our negro property may be worthless or nearly 
so, in a few years.”33  In Lexington, Frances Peter provided a good analysis of the 
situation.  In February 1864, she reported that the “value of negroes is greatly 
depreciated.  The hire of a servant for one year, being nearly, or quite equal to his fee 
simple value.”  Peter continued, “People do not care to risk the buying a species of 
property which if it does not ‘take wings and fly away,’ . . . often makes good use of its 
legs and runs off.”  “So most people,” she concluded, “prefer hiring to buying.”34
When slaves fled their owners, they often also took items required for agricultural 
production.  As early as 1862, Kentuckians worried about the loss of wagons and 
especially horses and mules.  That December, Lieutenant Lewis Dunn of the Third 
Kentucky Cavalry advised his father, “The reason I object to have a negro hired is that he
. . . might run off or might steal a horse and then you would lose horse and the rest of the 
servants and a white man can leave when he pleases but without pay.”35  August 1863 
saw Shaker Harvey L. Eades write, “We learn that numbers of Negroes & some horses 
are almost daily missing.”36  In May 1864, Ellen Wallace reported, “About sixty Negroes 
left town last night taking rockaways and horses from their owners.”37  In a time when 
armies on both sides impressed horses as they needed them, Kentucky’s farmers could 
not afford the additional loss of their agricultural animals.   
White Kentuckians also lost much of the manpower required to raise crops and 
perform other tasks.  Although some farmers, like Bourbon County’s C. F. Clay, worked 
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their slaves especially hard knowing that they were to be freed, post-emancipation 
agriculture proved to be difficult for many Kentuckians.38  As early as June 1863, 
Kentucky farmers began to feel the effects of emancipation.  Writing to Brigadier 
General Stephen A. Hurlbut, A. Bradshaw of Paducah complained of “the almost daily 
departure of slaves from their owners.”  Bradshaw continued that the flight of slaves had 
resulted in “the most ruinous consequences,” particularly “the total loss of their crops, 
now in cultivation.”  Moreover, slaveholders suffered from “apprehension of the loss of 
the labor necessary to complete and secure their crops.”39  Ellen Wallace reported that 
several Christian County slaveholders were left with no laborers except those too 
“helpless” to flee or work.40  
As the war progressed, slaves became fewer and it became more difficult for 
farmers to raise their crops.  By March 1865, an estimated 71 percent of Kentucky’s pre-
war slave population was legally free.41  In April 1865, General James S. Brisbin 
informed Governor Bramlette, “The Master can no longer hold his slaves or depend on 
their labor for a single day, so that producers cannot calculate their crops or pursue 
agriculture with any degree of certainty.”42  In July, John M. Lee complained that 
General John M. Palmer’s pass system was “producing a bad state of things here.”  Lee 
went on to write, “[F]armers cannot obtain help to save their Crop.”43  
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Because black enlistment increased the number of runaways, it intensified the 
labor shortage in Kentucky.  Describing the situation of many of his fellow Kentucky 
farmers, W. Hamilton Stockwell of Boyle County wrote, “In view of this enrolment and 
also of the uncertainty in regard to the construction of the Bill we hardly know whether to 
make a commencement of farming or not.”  Stockwell continued, “Its efforts will I fear 
be almost ruinous on the central and southern parts of the states.  What between 
enrolment & draft volunteering & stealing, and impressments . . . I am afraid we shall 
soon have no negroes to work on our farms and no possibility of substituting any other 
labor.”  Stockwell wondered if Kentucky’s congressional delegation could not “induce 
the Prest. by any sort of influence to postpone these measures until fall.  How are we to 
live & pay the heavy taxes imposed on us if no hands are left to us to till the ground.”44  
In the end, Kentuckians found that they would have to do the best they could without a 
captive labor force.
The economic effects of emancipation were also felt outside the realm of 
agriculture.  Daniel Hillman, owner of the Empire City Iron Works in Trigg County, was 
unable to continue operations after his slaves fled to army bases in Tennessee.  Hillman 
reported that as many as thirty of his slaves had run away to Clarksville, Fort Donelson, 
and Fort Heiman, all just across the state line.  As a result, Hillman had “stopped making
iron for over 18 months owing to the uncertain tenure of my hands.”  Instead, he began to 
grow wheat and tobacco only to “doubt whether I shall be able to Save my Crop” due to 
the continued flight of his slaves.45  In Louisville, Ellen Bodley found it difficult to find a 
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domestic servant.  Writing to her husband, she complained, “I am told that it is almost 
impossible to get a good servant the demand is so great, in consequence of the coloured 
servants running off in such numbers.”46  Because slavery touched so many sectors of the 
southern economy, few Kentucky industries were unaffected by emancipation.
Kentuckians also worried about the economic repercussions of the United States 
army hiring slaves.  Although antebellum slave hiring had been a successful part of the 
slave system in Kentucky and the rest of the Upper South, the military proved less 
reliable than local businessmen. While slave hiring before the war had in some ways 
undermined the controls of slavery, wartime hiring placed the institution in a precarious 
state. As the Union adopted emancipation as a war goal, soldiers in Kentucky began to 
treat hired slaves as freedmen.  An early problem was that the military sometimes paid 
wages directly to the slaves.  In his August 1863 order impressing six thousand black 
laborers, Brigadier General Jeremiah T. Boyle specified that all wages should go to the 
slaves’ owners, but this often did not happen.47  The previous month, Brigadier General 
Speed S. Fry at Camp Nelson reported that the clerk in charge of payroll had been paying 
slaves money that should have gone to their owners.48  In April 1864, Capt. W. W. 
Woodward, Provost Marshal General of the First Division of the District of Kentucky, 
reported that despite Boyle’s order, “Many of the Counties have never received pay for 
this labor or [been] remunerated in any way.”49
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The difficulty with recovering wages paid to slaves only increased after the war. 
In July 1865, the owners of the Louisville Hotel hired Wilson, a slave owned by an H. 
Hale of Simpson County.50  The hotel proprietors were unaware that Hale still owned 
their new employee and for the first month he worked at the hotel, they paid Wilson the 
wages he earned.  By August, however, Hale had learned that his slave was working in 
Louisville and demanded the money earned be given to him.  The hotel owners agreed, 
but Wilson complained to the Freedmen’s Bureau, who in turn insisted that Wilson be 
paid.  The bureau argued that slavery in Kentucky was “merely a nominal institution” and 
that Wilson, like all slaves in the state, was no longer property but a refugee, falling 
under the jurisdiction of the Freedmen’s Bureau.  In the end, Wilson collected his wages, 
and Hale received nothing.51
Once the military employed slaves, it became difficult for their owners to retain 
control of them.  In February 1864, four slaveholders from Marion County complained to 
Governor Bramlette that in December 1863 they had hired out several slaves to work as 
teamsters for the military.52  At the end of January, however, the army relocated their 
slaves to Nashville.  Once there, the slaves began to receive their own wages, and the 
quartermaster in Nashville ignored the slaveholders’ claim to the pay.  The petitioners 
were concerned that the army would not return their slaves when the hiring period was 
over.  Bramlette forwarded their concerns to the War Department, which seems to have 
taken no action regarding their case.53
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 Black Kentuckians soon realized that they should be the proper recipients of their
wages.  Writing in January 1865, T. A. Frazer of Russellville complained, “The negroes 
are generally of the opinion that the hire for this year will be ordered by the military
authorities to be paid to them.”54  Once owners realized that they would be unable to 
retain their slaves without compensation, some attempted to hire them as free laborers.  
One slaveholder in Lexington offered his slaves fifteen dollars a month and was able to 
maintain his entire workforce.55  Others proposed to share the products of the labor.56   
While some of these efforts were successful, the exodus of slaves from the countryside to 
towns and cities created such a labor shortage that most farmers could not find enough 
workers even when pay was offered.    
The absence of slaves was not the only difficulty for white Kentuckians.  The 
promise of emancipation altered the behavior of many blacks still held by their owners.  
Some enslaved people became disaffected simply by the idea of impending liberation.  
Others witnessed freedom first hand. Numerous slaves worked alongside freedmen as 
laborers for the Union army in Kentucky. Their employment separated them from their 
masters, and they enjoyed increased liberty while working for the military.57  When these 
slaves returned to their owners, they often exhibited newfound independence.  Many 
whites complained about the behavior of freedmen, finding them to be insolent and 
insubordinate, though such terms included any sign of independence or disobedience.58  
Kentuckians often described the laziness of slaves who expected their freedom, in the 
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words of Congressman George H. Yeaman, “without either work or fight.”59  In January 
1864, Frances Peter reported, “They [the slaves] are restless, impertinent, discontented, 
neglect their work, and run off in great numbers.”60  In April 1865, I. N. Steele, a 
slaveholder from Lexington, wrote to James S. Brisbin complaining that one of his slaves 
“has refused to serve me any longer, and affirms that he is as free as I am.”  Steele 
continued, “Said Boy has done me only one days work since Christmas.”61  Although 
legally bound to their masters, slaves had an option which was not available to them 
before the war.  If they grew tired of their masters, they could find work and shelter with 
the Union army.
Kentuckians realized the effect of emancipation on their economy.  The flight of 
slaves from their owners to federal forces created a loss of both assets and labor.  Hiring 
out slaves to the military further damaged Kentucky slaveholders’ control of their slaves.  
Losing the millions of dollars they had invested in slaves and their captive workforce, 
Kentucky’s economy suffered from a loss of capital and a decline in production.  From 
the Emancipation Proclamation through the Thirteenth Amendment, slaveholders 
attempted to retain slavery.  Despite their efforts, Kentucky’s antebellum economic 
system disappeared during the war and they deeply resented their losses.  Needing a 
scapegoat, they turned against the Lincoln administration and the Union cause.
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CONCLUSION
In July 1865, Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, Freedmen’s Bureau Assistant 
Commissioner in Kentucky and Tennessee, wrote to the head of the bureau discussing 
Kentucky’s inability to let go of slavery.1  Fisk stated, “The devotees of the barbarism 
cling to its putrid carcass with astonishing tenacity – Kentucky I fear will refuse to 
become one of the twenty seven (27) pall bearers required to put the great abomination to 
its final resting place.”2  Fisk was correct.  Kentucky, along with Delaware, refused to 
pass the Thirteenth Amendment.  While the rest of the Union states embraced 
emancipation, many Kentuckians refused to accept the demise of slavery.  From General 
John C. Frémont’s 1861 proclamation emancipating the slaves of Missouri rebels to the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865, white Kentuckians 
continued to oppose emancipation.  The arguments they used to resist black liberation 
came in three forms: legal and constitutional, racial, and economic.  Stemming from the
constitutionalism of the early-nineteenth century, many Kentuckians believed that 
presidential and congressional efforts at emancipation were unconstitutional.  Moreover, 
Kentucky Unionists believed that federal emancipation policy violated state constitutions 
and laws and infringed upon the right to property.  Kentuckians also based their 
opposition to emancipation on white nineteenth century perceptions of race.  They 
                                               
1 Clinton B. Fisk to O. O. Howard, 20 July 1865, in Ira Berlin, et al., Freedom: A Documentary History of 
Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series I, vol. 2, The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 705-7.
2 Ibid., 706.
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believed that black freedom would result in either race war, racial equality, or a class of 
destitute freedmen.  Finally, Kentuckians resisted emancipation because of its effects on 
the state’s economy.  From the first sign that slavery might not survive the war, they 
dreaded the loss of capital and the labor shortage that accompanied emancipation.  In 
Kentucky, as in much of the rest of the South, emancipation exacerbated political and 
social anxieties in the postbellum era.
The social upheaval of Kentucky in the late 1860s and early 1870s grew from the 
state’s opposition to wartime emancipation.  In The Civil War and Readjustment in 
Kentucky, E. Merton Coulter blamed the federal government, especially the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, for problems in the state.3  In Coulter’s analysis, the Radicals in the state and 
their Republican allies in Washington unfairly persecuted the Democrats, Conservatives, 
and former Confederates, who had Kentucky’s best interest in mind. Coulter failed to 
recognize, or willfully ignored, that conservative Kentuckians created much of the post-
war unrest.  Even more so than with the studies of Civil War Kentucky, scholarship on 
Reconstruction era Kentucky remains mired in interpretations voiced in the 1920s.4  As 
long as the Reconstruction era in Kentucky remains understudied and misunderstood, 
historians will be unable to grasp fully the effects of emancipation.  Yet, some 
conclusions can be drawn.  Most important, the abolition of slavery provided the catalyst 
                                               
3 E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1966; reprint, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966), especially 340-65, 411-39.
4 Other than Coulter, the primary study of Kentucky during Reconstruction is Ross A. Webb, Kentucky in 
the Reconstruction Era (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979).  While Webb’s analysis was a 
significant improvement over Coulter, the work cannot be considered authoritative or even completely 
successful because of its brevity.  Hambleton Tapp and James C. Klotter also wrote on the postbellum era, 
and like Webb, they improved the historiography, but the Reconstruction period only was only a small part 
of their focus; Hambleton Tapp and James C. Klotter, Kentucky: Decades of Discord, 1865-1900
(Frankfort: Kentucky Historical Society, 1977).  Most general histories of Reconstruction, like most Civil 
War scholarship, only deal with Kentucky in passing, if at all.  On the United States during Reconstruction, 
see Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1988).
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for Kentucky’s recoil from its northern allegiance.  While the process was not complete 
until years after Appomattox, the groundwork was laid during the war.  In addition, the 
difficulties Kentuckians had in adjusting to the end of slavery aggravated the problems of
adapting to a post-war world.  White Kentuckians’ responses to emancipation and black 
enlistment during the war shaped their reaction to black freedom into the Reconstruction 
era and spawned violence and political power to subjugate blacks.
The cause of much of Kentucky’s post-war anxiety was what historian Harold M. 
Hyman would have deemed a “failure of vision.”5  The state’s politicians could not 
envision Kentucky without slavery, and as a result, they resisted all efforts to end slavery, 
even once the institution had, for all practical purposes, become a dead letter.  By the end 
of fighting, only 30 percent of Kentucky’s pre-war slaves remained in bondage, but many 
Kentuckians would not accept a future without slaves.6  The perpetuation of slavery in 
the state remained an issue until it was abolished by constitutional amendment.  
Moreover, as historian Eric Foner argued, Kentucky lacked capable leaders who were 
willing to usher the state into a post-emancipation world.7  Governor Thomas E. 
Bramlette encouraged the General Assembly to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment, but that 
was a small gesture after fighting all previous emancipation policies tooth and claw.  The 
legislature opposed any effort at abolition as did most of the state’s delegation to
Congress.  The few Kentucky politicians who supported emancipation lacked support or 
and power to take the measures necessary to ease the state’s transition.  Likewise, few of 
Kentucky’s newspapers made successful attempts to guide the state, despite the efforts of
                                               
5 The quote comes from the title of Harold M. Hyman, Lincoln’s Reconstruction: Neither Failure of Vision 
nor Vision of Failure (Fort Wayne, IN: Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum, 1980).
6 Marion B. Lucas, A History of Blacks in Kentucky, vol. 1, From Slavery to Segregation, 1760-1891
(Frankfort: Kentucky Historical Society, 1992), 160. 
7 Foner, Reconstruction, 38. 
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George D. Prentice and Henry Watterson to alleviate social difficulties in the post war 
era.  Prentice, editor of the Louisville Journal, opposed emancipation throughout the war, 
but realizing that slavery was doomed, urged the state to accept the Thirteenth 
Amendment.8  By the end of the decade, Watterson, a Confederate veteran turned editor 
of the Louisville Courier-Journal, proposed a “New Departure” for the South.9  Rather 
than wallow in post-war misery over Confederate defeat and emancipation, Watterson 
urged Kentucky and the South to recognize the social and political rights of blacks as a 
step toward economic prosperity.  Neither Prentice nor Watterson was able to direct
Kentucky’s postwar policy, however, and the state remained attached to the corpse of 
slavery. Many of the political and social leaders who could have assisted Kentuckians’
adjustment to the post-war period failed the state and contributed to the continuing
problems of the Reconstruction era.  However, the blame also falls on common 
Kentuckians who would not listen to the appeals of more forward thinkers.
Emancipation and the difficulties of post-war life caused many white Kentuckians 
to adopt a pro-southern perspective.  Parts of Kentucky remained loyal to their Union 
heritage longer than others.  As they did during the secession crisis, Louisville and the 
towns across the Ohio River from Cincinnati resisted the state’s pro-southern shift.  
Scholar Robert B. Symon, Jr., argued that Louisville’s pro-southern shift came in the 
early 1880s.10  Appalachian Kentucky remained faithful to its Union past throughout the 
                                               
8 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 13.
9 For a description of the “New Departure” contrasted with the conservative Bourbon ideology, see ibid., 
29-36.  On Watterson, see Joseph Frazier Wall, Henry Watterson: Reconstructed Rebel (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1956).
10 Robert Bruce Symon, Jr., “‘Child of the North’: Louisville’s Transition to a Southern City, 1879-1885” 
(M.A. thesis, University of Louisville, 2005).  See also Anne Elizabeth Marshall, “Louisville and the Lost 
Cause: Memory, Identity, and the Creation of a Confederate City” (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 
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postbellum era.11  However, by the end of the war, much of the rest of the state was 
already on the path toward embracing their Confederate veterans.  However, even in 
those regions that praised returned Confederates, Kentuckians were pro-southern rather 
than pro-Confederate in sentiment.  Throughout the 1860s, Kentucky retained its 
Unionism, even while opposing the actions of the federal government.
Kentuckians first demonstrated their allegiance to the South in the realm of 
politics.  The major issues debated in the state elections of 1865 were the ratification of 
the Thirteenth Amendment and the restoration of rights to Confederate veterans.12  As a 
whole, Kentucky showed where its allegiance lay, electing sixty Conservatives and 
Democrats to the state house compared to forty Republican-sympathizing Unionists.  The 
Conservatives also carried the state senate.  Once seated, the legislators repealed the Act 
of Expatriation, a wartime measure that had stripped rebels of their political rights, and 
passed legislation guaranteeing rights to all white Kentuckians.  Governor Bramlette and 
Colonel Frank L. Wolford were among the Unionists who supported the legislation.  The 
reinstatement of political rights to Confederate veterans enabled them to run for office, 
which many soon did. In July 1867, Robert Winn, a Union veteran in Hancock County, 
predicted a “Confederate” victory in the upcoming elections.  “To be one of the returned 
grays,” he concluded, “is the next best thing to have been a partisan ranger during the war 
at home.”13  Winn’s forecast was correct.  The 1868 Kentucky legislature was so filled 
with former rebels that Coulter described it as “scarcely more than the meeting of a 
                                               
11 Anne Elizabeth Marshall, “‘A Strange Conclusion to a Triumphant War’: Memory, Identity, and the 
Creation of a Confederate Kentucky, 1865-1925” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 2004), 174-
208.
12 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 12-3; Webb, Kentucky in the Reconstruction Era, 13-5.
13 Robert Winn to Martha Cook, 25 July 1867, Winn-Cook Family Papers, The Filson Historical Society, 
Louisville, KY.
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Confederate regiment.”14  However, as Ross Webb argued, these actions were more
indicative of a pro-southern than a pro-Confederate stance.15  In the late 1860s, 
Kentuckians believed it necessary to form a solid front in order to resist what they 
perceived as federal interference in state affairs.
Showing their sympathies with the South, Kentucky’s congressional delegation 
opposed federal Reconstruction in the former Confederacy.  In April 1866,
Representative Burwell C. Ritter argued that since the South had surrendered, submitted 
to the Constitution, and accepted the provisions required for readmittance into the Union, 
continued Reconstruction was unnecessary.  Ritter concluded, “a Government kept 
together by military power” would never become “a restored Union.”16  A week later, 
Representative Aaron Harding echoed Ritter’s opinion, arguing that the South had 
“returned to their allegiance, yield[ed] obedience to the Constitution and laws, and 
anxiously desire[d] the restoration of the Union.”  As part of the reunified nation, 
Harding believed, the former Confederate states did not deserve to be the subject of a 
“political and congressional war” led by radical northerners.  Harding charged that the 
Republicans were subverting the Constitution by denying elected southern officials seats
in Congress.  What resulted, Harding proclaimed, was “an oligarchy [built] on the ruins 
of republican government.”17  The Kentuckians failed to prevent the passage of further 
Reconstruction legislation, and their sympathy with the South became so offensive to 
                                               
14 Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky, 419.
15 Webb, Kentucky in the Reconstruction Era, 15.
16 Burwell C. Ritter, Free and Slave Labor, Etc.: Speech of Hon. Burwell C. Ritter, of Kentucky, In the 
House of Representatives, April 21, 1866 (Washington, DC: Congressional Globe Office, 1866), 1, 7.
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northern Congressmen that Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner famously suggested
that Kentucky needed to be reconstructed.18
Kentucky’s resistance to emancipation during the war evolved into post-war 
opposition of the Freedmen’s Bureau and equal rights for blacks.  Many Kentuckians 
viewed the presence of the Freedmen’s Bureau as evidence that the federal government 
perceived the state as part of the conquered Confederacy.19  As a result, Kentuckians felt 
particularly aggrieved that the bureau operated within the state.  In 1866, a group of 
leading Unionists, including future Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
Lieutenant Governor Richard T. Jacob, and newspaper editor George D. Prentice, joined
to oppose the Freedmen’s Bureau in Kentucky.20  In Congress, Kentucky’s 
representatives and senators opposed legislation that reinforced the bureau.21 Bureau 
officials met with such levels of hostility and violence that some questioned whether it 
was worthwhile to continue operations in the state.22  Despite white resistance, the 
Freedmen’s Bureau persevered until January 1, 1869, when all bureau branches in 
Kentucky, except the office in Louisville, closed.
Kentuckians also resisted the expansion of political and civil rights to blacks.  In
1866, a state Democratic convention adopted resolutions condemning emancipation and 
                                               
18 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 1st session, Appendix, 482.
19 Ross A. Webb, “‘The Past is Never Dead, It’s Not Even Past’: Benjamin P. Runkle and the Freedmen’s 
Bureau in Kentucky, 1866-1870,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 84 (Autumn 1986): 346.
20 Webb, “Kentucky: ‘Pariah Among the Elect’,” in Richard O. Curry, ed., Radicalism, Racism and Party 
Realignment: The Border States during Reconstruction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 119-20.  
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intervention.
21 Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st session, 370-72, 743-44; Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st
session, Appendix, 69-74.
22 W. A. Low, “The Freedmen’s Bureau in the Border States,” in Richard O. Curry, ed., Radicalism, 
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equal rights for freedmen.23  While the convention accepted the end of slavery, they 
insisted that suffrage fell under the jurisdiction of the states as did the power to determine 
the rights of blacks, which, given the conservative nature of Kentucky’s Democrats, 
meant that African Americans would receive few civil and political rights. The 
legislature that rejected the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 refused to ratify the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in 1867 and 1869, respectively.24  In the U. S.
Senate debate over black voting rights, Garrett Davis voiced his constituents’ opinion on 
the matter, proclaiming “Negro suffrage is political arsenic.”25  Davis argued that while 
the body politic could stomach a few black voters, widespread suffrage would be 
poisonous to the democratic system. Opposition to black rights was so widespread that in 
Kentucky’s 1865-1866 legislative session that the state’s few Republicans endorsed 
resolutions condemning black suffrage and supporting the removal of the army and the 
Freedmen’s Bureau from the state.26
The violent reaction against emancipation and black enlistment also carried over 
into the post-war period.  Throughout the state, whites, former Unionists and 
Confederates alike, attacked blacks in an effort to maintain political, racial, and economic 
superiority.27  In his 1867 annual report, O. O. Howard, head of the Freedmen’s Bureau, 
reported that since October 1866, black Kentuckians had suffered “20 murders, 18 
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25 Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st session, 246.
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shootings, 11 rapes, and 270 other cases of maltreatment.”28  Additionally, in a two-year 
period in the late 1860s, vigilantes also burned ten freedmen’s schools and blew up 
another.29  In October 1869, James D. Ballance, a member of the Shaker community at 
Pleasant Hill in Mercer County, reported that the Elders and Deacons gathered to discuss 
threats they had received for hiring black laborers instead of whites.  At the end of the 
year, he wrote of one of the men hired by the Shakers being intimidated by local whites.30  
In a petition to the U. S. Senate in March 1871, six men representing “the colored citizens 
of Frankfort and vicinity” reported 116 attacks on freedmen in the area.  The committee 
complained that the legislature had adjourned without passing “any laws to suppress Ku-
Klux disorder.”  They appeal continued, “We would state that we have been law-abiding 
citizens, pay our taxes, and in many parts of the State our people have been driven from 
the polls, refused the right to vote; many have been slaughtered while attempting to 
vote.”31  The numerous incidents described by the Frankfort committee were only a 
fraction of similar incidents from around the state.  Historian George C. Wright has 
argued that although less notorious, the levels of violence in Reconstruction era Kentucky 
reached levels similar to the Deep South.32
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In his study of Reconstruction, historian Eric Foner described the effect of the 
Civil War and emancipation as akin to a “massive earthquake.”33  The conversion of 
millions of slaves into free people rattled white southern society to its core, and Kentucky 
was not exempt from the upheaval.  The events of the 1860s reverberated in Kentucky 
well beyond the Reconstruction era.  Federal emancipation policy contributed to the 
foundation of the pro-southern ideology that defined postbellum Kentucky.  Resenting
abolition as an affront to the United States Constitution, racial hierarchy, and economic
security, many Kentuckians saw themselves as having more in common with the defeated 
South than with their wartime allies in the North.  In the late-nineteenth century as the 
Civil War became more distant, the image of a Confederate Kentucky grew stronger.34  
Erecting Confederate monuments, electing Confederate veterans, and hosting 
Confederate reunions were all commonplace.  By the turn of the twentieth century, 
Kentuckians chose to ignore the state’s wartime loyalty to the Union.  For white 
Kentuckians, the legacy of emancipation meant a retreat from the Union.  
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